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ARTICLES
FANS, FREE EXPRESSION, AND THE WIDE WORLD OF SPORTS
Howard M Wasserman*
This field, this game, is apart of our past, Ray. It reminds us of all that once was good,
and that could be again. Oh people will come, Ray. People will most definitely come.
Field of Dreams'
People will come to ballparks, stadiums, and arenas (usually paid for by
the community for the exclusive benefit of a professional team2) to watch the
games being played. The controversy is over what people will say when they
get there.
Sport and free expression are American icons We talk about spor and
* AssistantProfessorofLaw, FIU CollegeofLaw. J.D. 1997,B.S. 1990, NorthwesternUniversity.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Seventeenth Cooperstown Symposium an Baseball and
American Culture in June 2005 and at the NINE: Journal of Baseball History and Culture Spring Training
Conference in March 2005. The author can be reached at howard.wasserman@fiu.edu.
1. FIELD OF DREAMS (Tri-Star 1989) (soliloquy by James Earl Jones).
2. See Steven A. Riess, Historical Perspectives on Sports and Public Policy, in THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF SPORTS FACILITIES 13, 14 (Wilbur C. Rich ed., 2000) [hereinafter SPORTS FACILITIES];
infra Part II.B.
3. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA 7 (1986) ("[T]he free speech idea nonetheless remains one of our foremost cultural symbols.
It is suffused with symbolic significance.'); HARRY EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 90 (1973) ("[S]port
is essentially a secular quasi-religious institution."); A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME FOR PARADISE:
AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 14 (1989) ("Sports represent a shared vision of how we continue, as
individual, team, or community, to experience a happiness or absence of care so intense, so rare, and so
fleeting...."); Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 367,392
(2004) [hereinafter Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech] (describing sport and speech as intersecting
American icons).
4. DANIEL L. WANN ET AL., SPORTS FANS: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF SPECTATORS
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we talk through sport.5 Fan expression is a long-standing and expected part
of these games, encouraged by the teams, the players, the cheerleaders, the
band, the scoreboard, and the music blaring over the sound system." Fans
become participants, seeking to help their teams win through their cheering.'
Fans develop elaborate pregame and cheering rituals and their own songs and
cheers.'
But how far does the right to engage in this expression go? Everyone is
encouraged to "root, root, root for the home team."9 But will fans be allowed
to root, root, root for the visiting team or (in a distinct message) against the
home team? Will fans be allowed to display banners and pennants criticizing
183 (2001) ("Because sport talk functions so well as small talk, it has become a very important vehicle for
communication in modern society."); Edward R. Hirt et al., Costs and Benefits ofAllegiance: Changes
in Fans 'Self-Ascribed Competencies after Team Victory Versus Defeat, J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL.
724, 724 (1992) ("Rarely do we go through a day without overhearing or participating in a discussion of
a recent or upcoming sporting event."); Mark S. Kende, Foul Language, in COURTING THE YANKEES:
LEGAL ESSAYS ON THE BRONX BOMBERS 233, 233 (Ettie Ward ed., 2003) ("People say provocative things
about professional sports."); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
800-01 (2001) (describing theprevalence of and protection fordiscussions of the Babe Ruth trade by aNew
Yorker in Boston).
5. See GIAMATTI, supra note 3, at 95 ("Where does America sing this poem, say this story?
Wherever baseball gathers.").
6. See DANIEL RoSENSWEIG, RETRO BALL PARKS: INSTANT HISTORY, BASEBALL, AND THE NEW
AMERICAN CITY 55 (2005) ("Yelling and screaming, rooting at the right time.., have long been essential
parts of the stadium ecperience."); id. (describing scoreboard encouragement of fans to "Make Some
Noise"); WANN ET AL., supra note4, at 112 ("An integral part of the spectator experience at many sporting
events is extreme noise levels."); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Fans and the First Amendment:
Cheering and Jeering in College Sports, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2004) ("[S]peech activities are
a central part ofattending collegiate athletic events."); Howard M. Wasserman, Cheers, Profanity, andFree
Speech, 31 J.C & U.L. 377,386 (2005) [hereinafter Wasserman, Cheers] (arguing that fans "are encouraged
to attend games and make noise.... to cheer for their team and players (and against the opposing team and
players)").
7. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 55 ("Fans who attend sporting events in part do so in order
to help their teams win games and thus feel themselves part of the action."); WANN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 182 ("The habits, traditions, and superstitions of sport spectators suggest that... they become active
participants, altering and constructing their own sports experiences."); George Vecsey, Fans, in SPORT
INSIDE OUT 122, 123 (David L. Vanderwerken & Spencer K. Wertz eds., 1985) ("[F]ans like to get involved
in the game, from shouting 'DEEEE-fense' to heckling the opposition.").
8. See WARREN ST. JOHN, RAMMER JAMMER YELLOW HAMMER: A JOURNEY INTO THE HEART OF
FAN MANIA 90 (2004) (describing a "long, swelling chant of 'Roll Tide, Roll' prior to kick-off at
University of Alabama football game); id. at 56 (quoting University of Alabama post-game chant: "Hey
'Dores! We just beat the hell out of you! Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer! Give 'em hell Alabama!");
seealso Michigan Songs, http://www.umich.edu/--bhl/bhl/exhibits/umosu/umsongs.htm (containing lyrics
to University of Michigan fight songs); The University of Chicago Fight Song, http://home.uchicago.edu/
-ahkissel/cheers.html (containing words to University of Chicago cheers, including various "Scholarly
Yells," for example "Thenistocles, Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, X squared, Y squared, H2SO,").
9. JACK NORWORTH, TAKE ME OUT TO THE BALL GAME (York Music Co. 1908).
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the owner, general manager, or coach?"° Will fans be permitted to wave
Confederate flags and other symbols?" Will one notable fan be able to walk
around the park in a rainbow wig carrying a poster reading "John 3:16"?' 2
How about the fan in red face paint and a cape making noises like a wolf or
like an industrial vacuum cleaner? 3 Will fans be able to participate in or
protest against sport's pervasive pregame and in-game patriotic expression,
symbolism, and ritual? 4 Will fans be able to cheer and jeer using profanity,
as with T-shirts or chants declaring "Yankees suck" or "Fuck Duke"?" Can
cheering rely on sexual innuendo and double entendre? 6 Can fans heckle
particular players about any and all issues and characteristics, relevant and
irrelevant to on-field performance? 7
These all are forms of what I call "cheering speech," the expression that
occurs at, and surrounds, sport. It "is a time-honored tradition that fans at
sporting events engage in speech ranging from throaty booing to 'symbolic
expression.""' i Cheering speech is about teams, players, coaches, officials,
team executives, or other fans. It supports, opposes, cheers, jeers, praises,
criticizes, heckles, and even taunts. It can be in support of one's own players
and team, against the opposing players and team, or even critical of one's own
10. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 40 (describing efforts by university officials to prevent
students from waving posters calling for the basketball coach to be fired); Kende, supra note 4, at 240
(describing a Major League Baseball team's efforts to remove banners criticizing the team owner); Robert
J. Misey, Jr, Free Speech at the Ball Park? Major League Baseball Violates the First Amendment, 3 GEo.
MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 227,228-29 (1993) (describing the same efforts); L. Jon Wertheim,Losing Their
Grip, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 24, 2001, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/sionlinenews/
2002/0 1/18/flash 122401/(describing incident in which a female fan and her boyfriend's son were removed
from the arena when the woman displayed a sign calling for the team president to be fired).
1i. See Giles v. Univ. ofMiss.,No. CIV.A.3:99CV125-P-A, 2000 WL 33907681, at *4 (N.D. Miss.
Aug. 29, 2000) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a university policy prohibiting fans from bringing
flags to football games); Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A.397CV21 IBA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *3 (N.D.
Miss. Nov. 12, 1999) (describing the same event).
12. Aubrey v. City of Cincinnati, 815 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (involving the
confiscation of a fan's "John 3:16" poster at a World Series game); see also John 3:16 ("For God so loved
the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal
life.").
13. See ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 228.
14. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 392-93 (describing patriotic rituals
surrounding sporting events).
15. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2-3; Kende, supra note 4, at 240; Wassernan, Cheers,
supra note 6, at 377; id. at 383-84.
16. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2-3; Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 383-84.
17. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 42; Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 381.
18. Calvert & Richards, supra note 6,at 4; see also ST. JOHN, supra note 8,at 227 ("[Flans feel freer
to go nuts over the game itself.").
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players and team. It can be about events on the field or about sport in a
broader context. Cheering speech can be oral, symbolic, or written on signs,
banners, clothing, and body parts. It can be in good taste or bad, clean or
profane, provocative, clever, or otherwise. And it will be loud and obvious.
Cheering speech should not be derogated as an insignificant category.
For one thing, we do not want anyone deciding that some expression lacks
import.19 For another, sport does not lack such import, possessing and
reflecting meaning in American society. 20 Sport is American culture;2 it is
low culture, perhaps, but we are not in the habit of leaving that
characterization to others.22 Fanship-affiliation with a sports team from
which individuals derive psychological and emotional significance and
value-is essential to that culture.23 And fans will express that fanship.24
Speaking about sports, particularly in the confines of a stadium or arena
during games, must be protected as cultural speech, as expression that builds
a culture on "all areas of human learning and knowledge."25 Like art or
literature, sport simply is one more such area of knowledge.26
Cheering speech also is part of the public discourse "about the common
stimuli that in fact establish the existence of a public," even if the matters
19. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 801.
20. See ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALLAND THE LAw 1-5(1998) (calling baseball the
"heart of America" that, like America, "continues to rebound along with the American spirie'); KATHRYN
JAY, MORE THAN JUST A GAME: SPORTS IN AMERICAN LIFE SINCE 1945, at 1 (2004) ("In modem American
society, sports are far more than just a game."); JOHN WILSON, PLAYING BY THE RULES: SPORT, SOCIETY,
AND THE STATE 331 (1994) (discussing the grand jurythat investigated the fixing of the 1919 World Series
by the Chicago White Sox that described baseball as"an American institution, having its place prominently
and significantly in the life of the people").
21. JAY, supra note 20, at 1 ("Sports saturate our culture as well as our language.").
22. See WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 205 ("[S]port spectating is not the trivial, infantile, and
superficial activity its critics claim."); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 131 (2003) ("[P]leasure is pleasure and is in the eye of the beholder, not
some cultural critic."); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 824 ("If high-value/low-value thinking were taken
seriously, a person could in principle bejailed forcalling Roger Clemens abum.");see also Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1098 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing against judges
playing culture critic), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
23. See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND
EDUCATIONAL VALUES 4 (2001); Hirt et al., supra note 4, at 724-25.
24. See WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198.
25. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245,257 (arguingthat literature and
the arts "lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which
the riches of the general welfare are created").
26. See WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198 (comparing the drama, ritual, and excitement of sport
to Ancient Greek theatre); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 779-80 (describing the need to recognize protection
for high and low cultural forms).
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seem trivial or irrelevant." Social and political issues-race, sex, crime,
community, education, patriotism-arise and play out in the context of
sports.2" Presidents since William Howard Taft have connected themselves
to America's games, whether by throwing out the ceremonial first pitch or by
calling a play for a favorite team during the NFL playoffs.29 Sports, politics,
and the official's own electoral ambitions merge.3 ° That being the case,
political expression and its mirror, political protest-the speech that all
recognize as occupying a core of First Amendment protection '-becomes
part of the cheering-speech milieu. Sport allows for the simple and unique
protest of heckling the President-especially if he does not throw a strike.
This Article explores in depth three distinct elements of cheering speech,
all of which must be present for it to enjoy full constitutional protection. The
analysis considers the effect on free-speech principles from the economic,
psychological, cultural, and sociological import of sports, sports stadiums, and
sports fanship.
Part I examines the public-forum nature of the grandstand or bleachers at
the ballpark or arena, the place where cheering speech occurs. The proper
characterization of the forum dictates the First Amendment rules that apply
there and the expression that can and cannot be regulated there.
Part II examines the nature of the entity that controls the relevant forum,
the stadium or arena. At one end is a state university controlling student-fan
speech in its arena, a state actor plainly bound by the limitations of the First
27. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 672-73 (1990).
28. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 3 ("[T]here is literally no institution or stratum in modem
American society Which is not touched in some manner by sport."); infra notes 202-18 and accompanying
text.
29. See Jennifer Allen, Nixon's Tricks Not in Redskins' Playbook, ESPN.com (Mar. 7, 2002),
http://espn.go.com/page2/wash/s/allen020308.htm (describing the story of President Richard Nixon
calling a play for the Washington Redskins during a playoff game); Christine L Putnam, A President
Inaugurates a Remarkable Tradition, BASEBALL ALMANAC (2003), http://www.baseball-almanac.com/
articles/president taft openingday.shtml (describing President William Howard Taft instituting the
ceremonial first pitch in 1911).
30. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 96 (describing the popular belief "that sport is and should be
supportive of 'the American way of life,"' reflected in the connection between sports and political leaders
and issues); JAY, supra note 20, at 141 (describing how President Nixon, a rabid sports fan, used sports to
associate with traditional, conservative American heroes and to appeal to the conservative values of sports
fans); see infra Part IILB.
31. See, e.g.,N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 254,270(1964) (describing "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials").
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Amendment.32 At the other end is a private university controlling fan speech
in its arena; this is a private actor controlling private property and ordinarily
not bound by those limitations (although certainly permitted to make the
private decision to govern its conduct according to free-speech principles).33
Somewhere in the middle is the prevailing situation in professional sports: an
ostensibly private entity (the franchise) regulating cheering speech in a
ballpark built largely with public funds, owned by the government, and
leased-long-term, exclusively, and on favorable terms-to the franchise.34
Only if that entity can be deemed a state actor will it be subject to First
Amendment restrictions in regulating cheering speech there.
Finally, Part Ill reaches the crux of the controversy over expression by
sports fans, examining the specific content of different examples of cheering
speech and the protection to which it is entitled.
I. FORUMS: SPACE, PLACE, AND SPEECH
Lillian BeVier argues that there are two competing models of the First
Amendment. Under the "Enhancement Model," the First Amendment
"sometimes imposes affirmative duties on government to maximize the
opportunities for expression."35 On the other hand, under the "Distortion
Model," "the essential task of First Amendment rules is to restrain government
from deliberately manipulating the content or outcome of public debate and
to prohibit it from censoring, punishing, or selectively denying speech
opportunities to disfavored views." '36
These models compete to define the scope of the duty of government to
create, and the right of the public to access, public forums for expression.3 7
Implicit in, and essential to, the freedom of speech is the need for adequate
physical space in which speech can occur. 8 As Timothy Zick argues, "debate
32. See Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A.397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *1 (N.D. Miss.
Nov. 12, 1999); Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 3-4; Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 377.
33. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001);
Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 414-15; infra Part H.A.
34. See Kende, supra note 4, at 241; infra Part ll.B.
35. Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating the Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992
SUp. CT. REV. 79, 101.
36. Id. at 102-03.
37. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1535, 1538 (1998) [hereinafter Gey, Reopening] (describing the "noble heritage" of thepublic forum
doctrine as a public space in which a single speaker can rail against government injustice and government
is powerless to stop her).
38. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581,581 (2006) [hereinafter
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can hardly be 'wide open' without adequate physical space for the airing of
positions and arguments .... [S]peech can thrive only when given adequate
room or space." '39 The public forum is a place for unfettered speech with a
built-in tolerance for boisterous and even offensive expression.40
Zick takes us one step further, suggesting that "speech and spatiality are
closely related," thus regulations on space may disparately impact certain
speakers and messages.4' It follows that some spaces are uniquely opened for
particular expression and some expression by some speakers is uniquely
appropriate in particular spaces.42 Such a place-content link exists between
the grandstand at a sports stadium and fans' cheering related to the game on
the field; the ability to engage in cheering speech in this place is critical to the
speaker's message.43
The distortion model controls public forum analysis, following Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.44 A space does not become a designated public
forum by inaction, but only by government "intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse."' Government makes a designated
public forum out of a space under its ownership and control when it
deliberately and intentionally opens that space for expression, while also
retaining broad control over whether that property is opened and on what
Zick, Spatial Tactics]; id. at 620 (emphasizing ways in which "speech and spatiality are intimately
related"); see also Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 633, 647 (1991) ("Societally, we should seek to expand that space and the opportunities for
discourse within it."); Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1575 (arguing that the public forum doctrine is
a mechanism to effectuate the broad command of the First Amendment).
39. Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 620.
40. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1536.
41. Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 638; id. at 65 l('To decide where expression takes place
is to ... make normative judgments about what speech should be seen and heard and what speech should
be segregated and avoided.").
42. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 30) [hereinafter Zick, Space], available at http://papers.
ssm.com/so13/papers.cfn?abstract-id=854264 (describing as "contested places" those areas that are part
of a specific ongoing controversy).
43. See id. (manuscript at 30) (arguing that the ability to protest in a given space may be critical to
the intended message); id. (manuscript at 30) (emphasizing the "contest, symbolism, and expression bound
up with these places").
44. 505 U.S. 672 (1992); BeVier, supra note 35, at 104 (describing public-forum rules as "well-
designed embodiments of the Distortion Model" that make considerable sense); Zick, Space, supra note
42 (manuscript at 15) ("[Vlery little of the Enhancement model has survived with regard to considerations
of place.").
45. Int'lSoc'yforKrishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680.
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terms.46 This includes the discretion to open a place only for speech on certain
subjects or by certain speakers, while keeping the space closed to speakers not
within the designated class.47 Courts further distinguish between general
access and selective access to a forum; government designates a forum when
it makes its property generally available to a class of speakers, but not when
it merely reserves space for a discrete class of speakers within the broader
community, then requires members of that class to obtain special permission
to gain access."8
Even under this constricted doctrine, the bleachers form a designated
public forum for fans and for cheering speech. Speech about sport is uniquely
fit for this place. The stadium or arena has been built, opened, and operated
specifically, intentionally, and explicitly with bleacher space set-off as a place
to which the public has been invited to engage in expression. The public as
a whole has been indiscriminately invited into the stands, making it a place of
general access. Fans must purchase a ticket to gain access, although there is
nothing inherently problematic with that, so long as the cost of the ticket is not
tied to their speech.49 Ticket prices are pre-determined neutrally by location
within the stadium-the closer to the field, the more it costs to gain access.5
A member of the public does not need special permission to purchase a ticket
and no inquiry is made into a fan's identity, intended rooting interests, or what
she wants to say as a condition of purchasing that ticket.
The Enhancement Model would create a much broader public forum right
by imposing on government an affirmative obligation to provide public forums
in order to enhance and increase opportunities for private expression."
46. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,523 U.S. 666,677-78 (1998); Gey, Reopening, supra
note 37, at 1566-67.
47. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983); Gey,
Reopening, supra note 37, at 1548, 1570 (criticizing such limitations as allowing govemment to open the
forum only for government-preferred speech); see also Int 71Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at
695 (1992) (Kennedy, J, concurring in the judgments) ("It leaves the government with almost unlimited
authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-related
purpose .... ).
48. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
49. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1992).
50. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 93 (comparing the "no-frills bleacher section" with luxury
skyboxes and enclosed restaurants overlooking the field); id. at 95-97 (tracing the history of bleachers as
a product of class and cost inequalities at ballparks).
51. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 170-71 (1989) (arguing that
government must provide opportunities for expressive activities); EMERSON, supra note 25, at 645 ("One
important way in which the government can affirmatively promote a system of freedom of expression is by
making available to individuals and groups the facilities for engaging in expression."); RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 208-09 (1992) (arguing that government has an obligation to provide
[Vol. 67:525
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Concurring in Krishna Consciousness, Justice Kennedy suggested that all
"open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be
public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a
precise classification of the property."52  The question is whether "the
objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public
access and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses."53
Steven Gey refines (and in some ways corrects) Kennedy's approach. Gey
defines as a public forum any "instrumentality of communication" (in this
case, a physical space) whose typical uses are compatible with and suitable for
speech.54 A government-owned space is a public forum unless speech would
be incompatible-i.e., would interfere in a significant way-with other, basic
uses of the space.55
Gey's modification of Kennedy's approach captures the nature of the
sports stadium forum. The basic use of the grandstand is expression; it is a
place for all fans to watch and cheer (whatever form that cheering takes) as the
players perform on the field below. By definition, no cheering speech can
interfere or be incompatible with the game and the bleachers. This is an open,
spacious, noisy, and active area.56 Cheering speech of some form and
substance is an expected, encouraged part of the game.57 "Once we determine
"green spaces" for expression); Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1538-39 (arguing that "every culture
must have venues in which citizens can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking about the world").
52. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgments).
53. Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments); compare Gey, Reopening, supra note 37,
at 1558 (arguing that Justice Kennedy's approach "provides a hint of the protections that would become
available to speakers in government venues" under a different public forum analysis) with BeVier, supra
note 35, at 115 (emphasizing possible negative side effects of intensive judicial scrutiny in public forum
cases).
54. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1570; see also Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness,
505 U.S. at 697 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
55. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1570, 1576; Zick, Space, supra note 42 (manuscript at
47) (arguing that compatibility "jibes well with the notion that governments have an affirmative obligation
to facilitate speech by making space for it"); see also Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at
698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments) (looking to whether "expressive activit[ies] would be
appropriate and compatible with" government's intended uses).
56. Berger, supra note 38, at 687.
57. See RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 56 ("Without cheering, without release, attending a game
loses one of its most profound appeals."); id. at 55 ("Yelling and screaming, rooting at the right time...
have long been essential parts of the stadium experience."); Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 16
("[S]peech activities are a central part of attending collegiate athletic events."); Wasserman, Cheers, supra
note 6, at 386 (arguing that fans "are encouraged to attend games and make noise, ... to cheer for their
team and players (and against the opposing team and players)"); supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
that property is a suitable public forum, all speech is entitled to an airing, even
when the public might vote otherwise."' 8 So long as some cheering speech is
compatible with the forum, all cheering speech is compatible with the forum,
regardless of the specific nature.59 Reliance on a compatibility analysis is
particularly appropriate given the unique "intersection of speech and
spatiality" between cheering and a sports arena.6°
Compatibility analysis must consider the essence of the particular activity
and the working relationship between noise and that activity. A ball game is
different from other public entertainment spaces, such as the theatre,
symphony, or opera, where audience speech of any kind during the
performance would significantly interfere and be incompatible with the
performance. We also can distinguish a basketball game from, for example,
a golf or tennis match, where the game's essential emphasis on player
concentration limits fan cheering, at least during play. 6' As such, the cheering
speech permitted at a basketball game may be incompatible with a tennis
match, even if played in the same arena and watched from the same seat in the
grandstand. Much of the time the determination will be easy enough: In one
sport officials insist on "quiet please," while in the other the scoreboard
implores fans to "make some noise."
Interference exists only when speech creates an actual problem in the
forum.62 For our purposes, this arises only when cheering prevents players on
the field from playing or other fans in the stands from watching and cheering.
One fan cannot physically interfere with another, as by waving a large flag or
banner in her face.63  But interference necessarily means more than fans,
players, or other participants "not liking" or "objecting to" or even being
58. Berger, supra note 38, at 686.
59. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 15 ("[I]t would be difficult to argue that speech
activities are incompatible with the ordinary functioning of the space."); see also Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments) ('IC]ourts must consider the
consistencyof those uses with expressive activities in general, rather than the speci fic sort of speech at issue
in the case before it .... ).
60. See Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 617.
61. Cf PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683-84 & nn.39-40 (2001) (defining the "essence"
of golf).
62. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1574.
63. See NCAA, REPORT ON THE SPORTSMANSHIP AND FAN BEHAVIOR SUMMIT 7 (Feb. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP] (notingthat one school does not permit anyspectator-made signs
into the basketball arena), available at http://www.ncaa.org/sportsmanship/sportsmanshipFanBehavior/
report.pdf; see also Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A.397CV21 IBA, 1999 WL 33537194, at * I (N.D. Miss.
Nov. 12, 1999) (describing a football stadium policy that prohibits fans from bringing in large banners or
flags).
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"offended by" the content of particular cheering speech. There is no
"heckler's veto" or "listener's veto" built into the forum, through which one
fan's dislike for, and unwillingness to tolerate, another's cheering renders the
latter incompatible.64 Speech is not incompatible merely because it "drowns
out" others by being louder, more boisterous, more numerous, or more
obvious.
Finally, cheering speech is about "sport," in all its effects and extensions,
on the field and off the field. There is no distinction for purposes of forum
analysis between speakers and speech immediately focused on the team's
performance on the field and speakers and speech focused on other interests
more tangentially related to the game.65 The question is one of compatibility
and interference; as long as particular content does not interfere with other
uses, it is compatible with, and thus within the constitutional scope of, the
forum.
The narrowness of the interference analysis is reinforced by the relevant
forum being not the ballpark as a whole, but only the grandstand within the
broader government-owned space. The grandstand is the "perimeter to which
speakers seek" access for expression.6 The fence or wall separating fans in
the grandstand from the players outside reinforces the bleachers as a distinct
public forum; it sits adjacent to the non-forum of the playing field and is
housed within a larger space. 67 But so long as speakers stay on the forum side
of the fence, they remain unrestrained in their expression.
The wall separating the grandstand from the field provides a clear line
between forum space, subject only to limited team or school control, and the
rest of the ballpark, subject to total team control. The team or school dictates
everything, expressive or otherwise, occurring on the field or coming from
64. Heidi Kitrosse, From MarshallMcLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner
and the First Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1339, 1369-70 & n.170 (2002) [hereinafter Kitrosser,
Communicative Manner]; Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 416-17.
65. But see United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir.
2004) (distinguishing, for purposes of defining the forum, between according access to fans having an
interest in the game and to fans seeking to protest the team's racist nickname).
66. See Air LinePilots Ass'n v. Dept. of Aviation,45 F.3d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 1995) (defining the
relevant public forum as the display cases within the airport, not the airport as a whole, which had been held
to be a non-public forum).
67. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1575 (arguing that much modem communication takes
place inside larger buildings and alongside buildings that are not expressive forums); see also United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 72 7-28 (1990) (considering the physical location of a particular space relative
to an established public forum); United Church of Christ, 383 F.3d at 452-53 (emphasizing the physical
proximity and similarity between a privately owned sidewalk and a publicly owned sidewalk in
characterizing the former as a public forum).
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cheerleaders, bands, mascots, the public-address system, organ, and
scoreboard.65 In fact, they engage in their own cheering speech via these
resources, both supporting the team69 and heckling the opposition.0
The fence defines incompatibility: a fan's expressive conduct actually
interferes when it leaves the grandstand and spills onto the field. At a game
at Dodger Stadium in 1976, two fans ran onto the field and tried to burn the
American flag. 7' They properly were arrested, not because of what they tried
to say or how they tried to say it (unquestionably an act of protected political
expression 72), but because they had no right to say it in that place. That
expression interfered with the game, eliminating the protection of the public
forum. The same is true of the fan at a women's college basketball game who
walked onto the court carrying an American flag, during the game, to confront
a player who had turned her back to the flag during the national anthem. 3 His
right to counter-speak to her protest ended where the bleachers ended.
One perhaps could argue that the government's power to establish a
"limited public forum" only for speech on particular subjects allows it to
define the forum to exclude the most objectionable or offensive cheering,
notably profanity. 74 Government might designate the grandstand as a forum
68. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 55 (describing the way in which a Major League Baseball
team uses the scoreboard to encourage fans to "Make Some Noise"); WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 182
(describing ways in which teams pull fans into participating in organized cheering rituals); Calvert &
Richards, supra note 6, at 44 (describing schools' uses of bands and cheerleaders to create and encourage
cheering speech); Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis Coleman, Hi-Jinks at the Ballpark: Costumed Mascots in
the Major Leagues, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1635 (2002).
69. The former music director for the Chicago White Sox played the song "Hurts So Good"
whenever the Sox' Frank Thomas was at bat, in honor of Thomas' nickname of"The Big Hurt." Jim Caple,
Who Let the Prudes out?, ESPN.com, Apr. 24, 2003, http://espn.go.com/page2/s/caple/020424.html.
70. For example, the music director at Minnesota's baseball stadium once played "I Want to Be
Rich" prior to a game started by a pitcher who had left the Twins to play for more money for another team.
See id. Unlike with the speech of fans in the grandstand, the team controls the individuals who perform
these jobs and can prohibit objectionable cheering speech on the team's behalf For example, the same
former music director for the White Sox played the song "Here I Go Again" while the visiting pitcher was
warming up prior to the game. This was an obvious reference to that pitcher's ongoing, public divorce from
an actress who had appeared in a video for that song, writhing on the hood of a car. See id. The director
was fired, a move that is, descriptively, within the power of the team in controlling its own in-park
expression. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When is it "McCarthyism "? When is it Proper?, 93
CAL. L. REv. 1413, 1427 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Deterring Speech] (arguing that private employers
are not required to provide a platform for disagreeable messages by employees).
71. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 395-96.
72. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding that flag burning is protected
expression); Wasserman,Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 395 (describing one form of"symbolic
counter-speech" as attacking a symbol by destroying it).
73. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 433.
74. See infra Part IILD.
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only for "decent, non-profane, fan-friendly, cheering speech." Profanity and
other offensive speech (and those who utter it) may be excluded from the
forum because they are not within the class of speakers for whose special
benefit the forum is reserved.
But the free speech values served by the public forum doctrine suggest
that the presumption as to the scope of the forum always should run in favor
of unfettered speech." This constrains government's ability to define speech
or speakers out of the forum. One limitation is that government cannot limit
the forum only to particular viewpoints on a particular subject or issue.76 In
simplest terms, the forum cannot be defined as a space only for pro-University
of Maryland or pro-Philadelphia Eagles cheering, meaning pro-Duke
University or pro-Dallas Cowboys cheering falls outside the defined forum.
A definitional limitation to decent, non-profane, family-friendly speech
fails for similar reasons. Although not resolved as a public forum case,
National Endowmentfor theArts v. Finley77 is instructive. That case involved
a challenge to a federal statute requiring the NEA to consider "general
standards of decency" in awarding grants to artists.78 Three justices argued
separately that the decency rule was viewpoint discriminatory because it
limited NEA funding only to "decent art" within the broader category of
"art."79 Limiting a designated public forum only to "non-profane" cheering
speech from within the broader category of cheering speech similarly defines
the forum by viewpoint.80 It excludes from the scope of the forum speech on
the subject matter covered by the forum-cheering about this game and its
surrounding circumstances-that comes from a particular (indecent or
profane) point of view.
75. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1574.
76. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (stating that the power
to reserve a forum for certain groups or subjects does not allow the reservation of the forum based on
viewpoint); Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that
the state may not discriminate on viewpoint in defining scope of forum); Calvin Massey, Public Fora,
Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTInGs L.J. 309, 322 (1999) (arguing that "a
limited public forum can be created by content-based but not viewpoint-based means"); infra Part III.A.
77. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
78. The majority upheld the provision, concluding that the rule only required the NEA to "consider"
those standards, but did not prohibit funding projects that did not conform to those standards. Id. at
572-73; id. at 583-84 (describing the requirement as a "vague exhortation" to "take them into
consideration").
79. See id. at 593 (Scalia, J.,joined byThomas, J., concurring in thejudgmnts); id. at 606 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
80. Cf Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1608 (arguing that government could establish a forum
for "art," but not only for "decent art").
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II. THE STATE ACTION PROBLEM
As a general rule, of course, the First Amendment binds only government
actors, not private entities."1 Once we characterize the stadium grandstand as
a forum for cheering speech, First Amendment protection for fan speech
depends on the nature of the entity controlling the stadium forum.
Commentators long have criticized the state action requirement, arguing that
it insulates wrongful private conduct from legal sanction and denies broader
protection to individual rights.82
During the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s, the Supreme Court expanded
the concept of state action, holding that, under certain circumstances, a
sufficient connection between government and an ostensibly private entity
converted the latter into a state actor, subjecting its conduct to constitutional
limitations.83 This expansion of state action enabled the Supreme Court to
expand the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to halt racial discrimination
by ostensibly private actors in the Jim Crow South.84 These cases arguably
81. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,295 (200 1); Julian N.
Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish
There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1544 (1998); Kende, supra note 4, at 241; Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briar-Patch: An Argument in Favor ofConstitutionalMeta-Analysis in State
Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302, 305-06 (1995) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, Back to the
BriarPatch].
82. Charles L. Black, Jr., Forward: "StateAction, "Equal Protection, and Califomia's Proposition
14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967) ("The amenability of racial injustice to national legal correction is
inversely proportional to the durability and scope of the state action 'doctrine,' and of theways of thinking
to which it is linked."); Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech is Better, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1635, 1639 (1998)
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, More Speech] ("Traditional law, as embodied in the state action doctrine, creates
a bright-line rule that the private institution always wins ...."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505 (1985) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Rethinking] ("It is time to again ask
why infringement of the most basic values-speech, privacy, and equality-should be toleratedjust because
the violator is a private entity rather than the government."); David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil
Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 409 (1993) ("During the civil rights revolution, the state action
doctrine became, in a word, the enemy.").
83. See BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 295 ("[S]tate action maybe found if, though only if, there
is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of Things Past?:
Reflections on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 1064
(2002) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, Remembrance] ("[Tihe Warren Court's efforts made it very difficult for
government to avoid responsibility for racial discrimination .... [T]he expanded scope of state action
doctrine greatly facilitated the Warren Court's equality project."); Strauss, supra note 82, at 410 ("Private
action may or may not be 'state action,' depending on a variety of functional concerns.").
84. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (holding that a state constitutional
provision authorizing racial discrimination in housing made discrimination a state-sanctioned policy);
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were mooted by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which expressly prohibited
racial discrimination by non-state actors in public accommodations."3
But similar statutory protections do not exist for individual speech rights,
which remain subject to private abridgement.86 This means that sports fans
may enjoy and enforce their cheering-speech rights only if the entity (the
professional franchise or university) controlling the stadium or arena qualifies
as a state actor that can be bound by the First Amendment.
A. College Sports
For college athletics, there are two polar options. The forum could be
controlled by a public university, an arm of the state, such as the University
of Maryland. There is no question that a state university is bound by the First
Amendment in attempting to regulate fan expression.87 And state universities
recognize and proceed from that understanding in analyzing their constrained
power to regulate cheering speech.8 The other option is that the controller is
a private university, not bound by the First Amendment and free to regulate
speech in its on-campus spaces (perhaps even to the point of eliminating all
crowd noise).89
Additional regulations on cheering speech may come from the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and individual collegiate athletic
conferences. In 2003, the NCAA held a conference on fan behavior and
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (holding that a municipal park transferred to control by a
private trustee retained its public character and continued to be bound by Fourteenth Amendment
prohibitions on race discrimination); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 717 (1961)
(holding that the discriminatory exclusion of African American patrons by a private restaurant leasing
public space was discriminatory state action); see also Krotoszynski, Remembrance, supra note 83, at 1063;
Strauss, supra note 82, at 413.
85. See Strauss, supra note 82, at 413; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
86. See Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 82, at 1636-37 C(Speech-and all of its benefits to
the individual in expressing a message and to society in receiving it--can be lost just as much when private
entities prohibit and punish it as when the government does so.").
87. See Crue v. Aiken, 370 F3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the lawsuit involving the
protest of a public university's Native American mascot raised First Amendment issues); Barrett v. Khayat,
No. CIV.A.397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 12, 1999) (applying a First
Amendment analysis to a state university restriction on flags inside an on-campus football stadium).
88. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2-3 (describing steps taken by the University of
Maryland and the Maryland government in analyzing potential restrictions on cheering speech at basketball
games); Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 377-78 (same).
89. See Eule & Varat, supra note 81, at 1540-41. But see Larry Alexander, The Public/Private
Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 374 (1993) (arguing
that a private university with a speech code causes effects on constitutional values comparable to those
caused by a public university).
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sportsmanship." Out of that meeting came a definition of sportsmanship and
an insistence that schools establish policies and procedures relating to sporting
and ethical conduct.9 Most conferences have established fan-behavior
policies to be followed by member schools."
The Supreme Court has held that the NCAA does not act under the color
of law of any one state, because it is composed of both private and public
entities located in all fifty states and any one state plays only a minor role in
formulating and enforcing the association's rules.9 The same reasoning
presumably would apply to individual conferences, similarly composed of
public and private universities from several states.94 Although NCAA or
conference rules themselves are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, they
become so when a public university adopts and enforces those rules as their
own." The rules remain private if the enforcing school is private.
This creates a seemingly odd dichotomy even among schools within the
same athletic conference. Officials at a private member of the Atlantic Coast
Conference, such as Duke University, can more strictly control student
cheering than can officials at a public university in the same conference, such
as the University of Maryland or the University of North Carolina. Duke
could enforce some conference regulations that Maryland or North Carolina
may not. But that dichotomy is a product of long-existing constitutional
norms.96 We (and fans engaged in cheering speech at private-university
arenas) are stuck, at least in the absence of a dramatic expansion of the state
action doctrine in the university context.97
90. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2-3.
91. Id. at 3 & n.7; see also REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63, at 2, 15.
92. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 32-45; REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63,
at 15.
93. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193-94 (1988).
94. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 33-34 & nn. 196-202 (identifying members of several
collegiate conferences). The line between Brentwood Academy and Tarkanian was the line between an
association with members located within the same state and onewith member schools spread across several
states. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001) ("'The
situation would, of course, be different if the [Association's] membership consisted entirely of institutions
located within the same State, many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign."' (quoting
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n.13)).
95. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 (emphasizing that, although thepublic university was influenced
by the organization's rules, the public university imposed the punishment); id. at 194 ("UNLV engaged in
state action when it adopted the NCAA's rules to govern its own behavior ... ").
96. See Eule & Varat, supra note 81, at 1541 (describing this dichotomy and the resistance to it as
"part ofa rich tradition").
97. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 89, at 374 (arguing that a private university with a speech code
"will cause effects on constitutional values comparable to those a public university would cause");
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B. Professional Sports
Professional sports present a more complicated situation. Professional
sports leagues and their individual franchises are private entities." But public
financial support for sports franchises, in a variety of forms, dates to the
earliest days of professional sports.99
Most importantly, many teams play in arenas and stadiums that are
publicly financed and publicly owned, leased to the team on a long-term and
exclusive basis on highly favorable terms. 0  Beginning in the late 1950s and
1960s, stadium construction became the primary means of public
subsidization. I0 ' That process reached new levels starting in the late 1980s
and early 1990s;1°2 since that time, more than sixty stadiums and arenas either
were built or renovated for professional sports teams at massive, largely
public, expense.0 3 And teams continue to seek public funding.'0 4
Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 82, at 1643 (arguing in favor of statutes that provide individuals
in private schools the same speech rights as individuals in public schools); infra Part II.C.
98. See ABRAMS, supra note 20, at 161 ("Despite its self-proclaimed status as our 'national'
pastime, baseball is not a governmental entity.").
99. See Riess, supra note 2, at 18-19 (describing efforts in the 191Os to construct public sports
stadiums).
100. See Bruce W. Hamilton & Peter Kahn, Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballpark in SPORTS, JOBS,
ANDTAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 245,252 (Roger G. Noll &Andrew
Zimbalist eds., 1997) (hereinafter SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES]; Misey, supra note 10, at 244; Robyne S.
Turner, The Politics of Design and Development in the Postmodern Downtown, 24 J. URB. AFF. 533, 533
(2002) [hereinafter Turner, Politics of Design].
101. See Riess, supra note 2, at 14 ("Since the 1950s, and especially themid-1960s, cities havegone
into the business of subsidizing professional sports, especially major league baseball and professional
football, by building stadiums to house local franchises.").
102. See id. at 35.
103. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 123 (stating that sixteen new baseball parks were built in that
time at a cost of $4.9 billion dollars, two-thirds of which came from public coffers); Kevin Clark Forsythe,
The Stadium Game Pittsburgh Style: Observations on the Latest Round ofPublicly Funded Sports Stadia
in Steel Town, US.A.; and Comparisons with 28 Other Major League Teams, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 237
app. at 267-302 (2000) (breaking down costs for thirtybaseball and football stadiums); Judith Grant Long,
Full Count: The Real Cost of Public Fundingfor Major League Sports Facilities, 6 J. SPORTS ECON. 119,
121-25 (2005) (charting the cost of projects in all four major professional sports through 2001 and showing
that the actual public subsidies are underreported); Allen R. Sanderson,In Defense ofNew Sports Stadiums,
Ballparks, and Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 173 (2000) (arguing that eighty percent of teams soon
would be playing in facilities built since 1990 at a combined cost of more than $20 billion); Edward I.
Sidlow & Beth M. Henschen, Building Ballparks: The Public-Policy Dimensions of Keeping the Game
in Town, in SPORTsFAcILrrIES, supra note 2, at 153, 153 (quoting estimates of forty-five stadiums ata cost
of $9 billion); Daniel McGraw, Demolishing Sports Welfare, REASONONLINE, May 2005, http:J/
www.reason.com/0505/fe dm.demolishing.shtml (quoting an advocacy organization placing the figure at
a cost of $17.3 billion, of which sixty percent came from public funding, for sixty-six stadium projects
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Stadiums are built either to keep an existing team from skipping town or
to lure a new team into town.'0 5 Teams insist they need these new, publicly
funded stadiums to be competitive on the field and off.'0 6 And the situation
is so dire, they claim, that the franchise may be forced to relocate.'0 7 Whether
teams actually follow through on that threat, the pain felt by cities burned by
the notorious relocations (Brooklyn and the baseball Dodgers, Baltimore and
the NFL Colts, and Cleveland and the NFL Browns) makes the threat real
enough.' Given the scarcity of professional sports franchises, there always
is another community willing to make a play to bring a team into town by
building its own modem stadium.'19
State action analysis should take these circumstances into account in
characterizing professional teams. Government expends public funds on a
between 1990 and 2003).
104. See McGraw, supra note 103 (describing efforts by the owner of the Dallas Cowboys to secure
public funding); Katharine Q. Seelye, Baseball Deal Back as Washington Council Blinks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22,2004, at A20 (describing the controversy over public funding for a ballpark in Washington, D.C.);
Fred Grimm, New Pitch Thrown in Ball Park Quest, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2005, at 3B (describing
efforts to obtain public funding for a baseball park in Miami-Dade County).
105. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Greener Pastures, in COURTING THE YANKEES, supra note 4, at 291,
294 ("[T]eam after team has used the threat of a move to extract concessions from its home city."); Sidlow
& Henschen, supra note 103, at 155 ("[Tlhe real story in baseball may be one of cities actively working to
keep the teams they have."); Robyne S. Turner & Jose F. Marichal, Exploring Politics on the Sports Page,
in SPORT S FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 189, 190 ("Because of the highly coveted nature of sports franchises,
cities compete with each other to put together the most attractive package to either lure or maintain sports
teams in given localities."); Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Stadiums, Teams, and Cities, in SPORTS
FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 57, 58 (stating that cities "imprudently offer the kitchen sink in their efforts
to retain existing teams or attract new ones").
106. See RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 27 (describing the increased spending and success of the
Cleveland Indians baseball team after the opening of a new ballpark); ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 132
(discussing the link between new ballparks and team success).
107. ZIMBALIST, supra note22, at 124; see JAY, supra note 20, at 211-13 (describing a spate of NFL
moves in the 1980s and 90s); ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 91 ("[lt was only after taxpayers paid to
replace Cleveland Stadium with Jacobs Field that the Indians stopped threatening to move."); Lynn W.
Bachelor, Stadiums as Solution Sets: Baseball, Football, and Downtown Development, in SPORTS
FACILITIES, supra note 2, at 125, 126 ('[M]ajor league sports teams, like large corporations, have made
effective use of relocation threats .... ).
108. See JAY, supra note 20, at 84-86 (discussing the relocation of the Dodgers in 1957); id. at
211-12; Riess, supra note 2, at 27-28, 37-38; Sidlow & Henschen, supra note 103, at 155.
109. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 124.
With excess demand for teams, cities are thrust into competition with each other to obtain or retain
a team. This competition leads cities to offer public funds for facility construction and more
favorable lease terms. The greater the competition, the more financing and the more concessionary
the lease terms the city must offer.
Id.; Zimbalist, supra note 105, at 57 ('U.S. team-sports leagues... maximize their profits by reducing the
supply of franchises below the demand for franchises from economically viable cities. The result is that
cities are thrust into competition with each other to procure or retain teams.").
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stadium or arena expressly for this team's exclusive, long-term use. The terms
and conditions on which the community funds and builds stadiums in order to
keep "their" teams in town changes the nature of the sports franchise, at least
for purposes of operating the stadium and deciding what fans can say there.
1. Symbiotic Relationship
The zenith of the expansion of state action in situations of joint
public/private participation"' was the "symbiotic relationship" test attributed
to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."' The Court found that a private
restaurant leasing space in a publicly owned garage was a state actor and
could not, under the Fourteenth Amendment, discriminate against customers
based on race." 2 The Court emphasized the exchange of "benefits mutually
conferred" between the government and the restaurant; the restaurant
benefited from government-provided upkeep, maintenance, repairs on the
building, convenient parking for patrons, and the prestige of location in that
building, while the government gained the parking revenue from restaurant
patrons and increased rent from greater restaurant profits.' These facts
placed the state and the restaurant "into a position of interdependence" such
that they became joint participants in the challenged activity of operating the
restaurant in a way that discriminated against customers on the basis ofrace."4
Ronald Krotoszynski called this test an "open-ended inquiry into the
relationship between the state and the private entity in order to ascertain
whether it would be fundamentally fair to hold the private entity accountable
for constitutional violations."' 1" Application of the test is fact-intensive and
varies with circumstances." 6 A similar inquiry into the relations among the
government, community, and team reveals a symbiotic relationship,
110. See Krotoszynski, Remembrance, supra note 83, at 1063.
111. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
112. Id. at 726.
113. Id. at 724-25.
114. Id. at 725.
115. Krotoszynski, Remembrance, supra note 83, at 1063;see also Alexander, supra note 89, at 372
(arguing for consideration of whether the negative effects on constitutional values from private actions are
comparable to the negative effects on constitutional values from the analogous governmental action).
116. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."); Strauss,supra
note 82, at 410 ("Private actions may or may not be 'state action,' depending on a variety of functional
concerns.").
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considering why teams demand stadiums, why communities are willing to
fund them, and the specific terms on which they are built and operated.
Teams insist that the new ballpark will bring with it increased revenues,
allowing the team to be financially successful off the field and giving it the
money to attract and retain high-priced superstar players who can make the
team successful on the field."7 Teams expect a sharp rise in attendance in the
early years of a new ballpark, especially one that combines the intimate,
romantic style of old urban neighborhood ballparks with the amenities and
secondary diversions of modem stadiums."' Average attendance at Oriole
Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore-the first of baseball's throwback parks
beginning in the early 1990s and widely regarded as the most, if not only,
successful public financing project' '"-spiked in the first five years the
Orioles played there. 20 Of course, attendance and public support for the deal
wither, often after only one year, if competitive success on the field does not
follow.' 2,
The critical piece of the financial circle from the team's perspective is a
favorable lease under which the team keeps a substantial (if not complete)
share of the nontraditional revenues associated with the special features of
modem ballparks.' These include revenues from luxury skyboxes and
premium seating sold to corporations and businesses; corporate advertising
within the stadium (including on outfield fences); exclusive concession rights;
ballpark naming rights from corporate interests having no connection to the
team, ownership, or history; and "personal seat licenses" (PSLs), a fixed fee
117. See RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 27; ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 132.
118. See RoSENSW EIG, supra note 6, at 38-40 (describing the rise of"new old stadiums" that sought
to replicate ballparks of the past); id. at 146; WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 65-66; Robert A. Baade, Home
Field Advantage? Does the Metropolis or Neighborhood Derive Benefit from a Professional Sports
Stadium?, in SPORTS FACILrrIES, supra note 2, at 71, 72-73; Sanderson, supra note 103, at 175, 181.
119. See Hamilton & Kahn, supra note 100, at 245.
120. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that the Orioles sold out every game in the early
years of the park); Hamilton & Kahn, supra note 100, at 24546,252-55; see also ZIMBALIST, supra note
22, at 13 2-33 (describing attendance benefits resulting from Camden Yards being the first throwback park).
121. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 169 (describing decreased revenues in Cleveland's new
baseball park when the team's successful run and consecutive-sellout streak ended six years after the new
park opened); ZJMBALIST,supra note 22, at 132 (arguing that the novelty of new stadiums attracts curious
fans in the first year, but is not enough by year two); Stevea Fainaru, Selig Plays Hardball on Stadium
Deals, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at Al (describing community dissatisfaction with a ballpark deal in
Milwaukee, which produced a structurally problematic park and did not produce a winning team).
122. See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium-Create the Jobs!, in SPORTS, JOBS,
AND TAXES, supra note 100, at 1, 8.
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giving a customer the right to purchase expensive season tickets.' The team
also counts on the public picking up much or all of the construction cost.2 4
From the other side, the public and public officials support these projects
in anticipation of numerous community benefits expected to flow from the
stadium." 5 One is the boost to the local economy, especially in the
neighborhood surrounding the ballpark. The theory is that "'if you build it,
they will come'-and in large numbers bringing obscene sums of money and
other commercial activity with them...."'26 Stadiums are a prominent feature
of large-scale urban redevelopment plans, expected to attract restaurants, bars,
stores, and residential life, and to bring tourism and recreation dollars to the
area. 12  Some supporters argue that professional sports franchises are
necessary for a community to attract the young, educated, affluent
demographic essential to a thriving metropolitan area.'28 Perhaps more
important is an intangible benefit-the psychic, symbolic, and cultural benefit
to the community of being a "major league city" and the civic pride and unity
created by luring or keeping a successful team.'29
123. See id. at 8-9,12, 18, 20-21;see also Forsythe, supra note 103, app. at 267-302 (detailing terms
of lease agreements for thirty Major League Baseball and professional football facilities, showing teams
keep most or all of these various revenue sources); see also Ziona Austrian & Mark S. Rosentraub,
Cleveland's Gateway to the Future, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 100, at 355, 364; Misey,
supra note 10, at 235-36.
124. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 129 (stating that public costs hover around seventy percent
of the construction cost); Long, supra note 103, at 139 (finding that the average public share, after
adjustment for omitted subsidies, is seventy-nine percent).
125. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 125 (summarizing the process of building community,
business, political, and electoral support); Turner & Marichal, supra note 105, at 197-98 (describing the
range of public support for stadium projects from "oblique support" to "boosterism"); Robyne Turner, Civic
Pride and Professional Sports, 18 PuB. ADM IN. TiMEs 8,8 (1995) [hereinafterTurner, Civic Pride] ("When
citizens and fans begin to see multiple returns on their investment, they will value their teams and recognize
their funding as an investment.").
126. Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, Bearing Down in Chicago: Location, Location,
Location, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 100, at 324, 328.
127. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 4 (describing Camden Yards in Baltimore as a "dramatic
symbol of the new urbanism" and an "anchor of downtown redevelopment"); id. at 4-5 ("It was to afford
patrons the ability to combine a ball game with shopping, dining, and, above all, a simple city stroll.");
WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 66 ("[Y]ou will park yourcar downtown, walk past a restaurant or bar and
maybe stop.... Inside, the buzz will be even louder. You will see downtown. People are having fun just
because they are there."); ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 130 ("[S]uch construction could facilitate efforts
to redevelop an urban core."); Baade, supra note 118, at 74-80 (analyzing types of economic impacts that
stadiums are thought to have); Turner & Marichal, supra note 105, at 189 ("[S]tadiums are widely
perceived as economic magnets that create jobs by attracting capital from outside the central city.").
128. RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 10.
129. See id. (describing "side benefits, including the generation of civic pride"); id. at 27-28
(describing a "sense ofsolidarity among citizens," creating random conversations, smoothing over race and
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Economists reject the idea that stadiums can or do produce tangible
financial benefits for the community. 3 It is particularly questionable given
that the actual public subsidy (and the percentage of the stadium development
and operation subsidized by the community) usually far exceeds reported
public contributions. 3' But even critics of the economic arguments agree that
the civic-pride benefits, if explicitly made part of the public debate, justify the
expenditure.'32 For many in the community, "a subsidized team is better than
no team at all."'33 Whether the sense of pride from the team's success is
worth a $1 billion investment becomes a question of public policy."'
Whether any, all, or none of the benefits are realized is beside the point
for purposes ofjoint participation. It is enough that teams demand stadiums
and the community brings them into existence-all in joint pursuit of those
mutual benefits. It is enough that the community engages in public policy
class differences, and creating connection within the community); ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 132 ("In
the case of a stadium these benefits may include self-image enhancement fora city or greater community
cohesion."); Riess, supra note 2, at 24 (describing the belief that teams enhance prestige, demonstrate
community spirit, and help build feelings of community); Sanderson, supra note 103, at 176 (describing
intangible benefits of "city unity, 'civic pride,' and some notion of the team conferring 'big league status'
on the community"); Sidlow & Henschen,supra note 103, at 155 (describing "'team-less' cities that would
love to become 'big league'); Turner, Civic Pride, supra note 125, at 8 ("If a spirit of community can be
found in the arts, culture, and beauty, why not in sports?").
130. ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 125 ("[E]very independent economic analysis on the impact of
stadiums has found no positive effect on output or employment."); Baade, supra note 118, at 87-88; Long,
supra note 103, at 139 (arguing that better public and government understanding of the real costs of
stadium projects is necessary to ensure better decision making about undertaking such projects); Noll &
Zimbalist, supra note 122, at 28; Turner & Marichal, supra note 105, at 189 ("[T]he effectiveness of a
stadium strategy as an economic-development policy approach has been successfully challenged in many
cities.").
131. See Long, supra note 103, at 140 (arguing that the real public cost of projects often is kept out
of the public debate by government and subsidy advocates); id. at 121-25 (displaying a chart showing
reported public subsidies, actual public subsidies after adjustment, and actual percentage of projects paid
for by the public); Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 122, at 25 ('IT]he actual magnitude of the subsidy is
typically greater than the estimate in the plan owing to numerous systematic errors in estimating the costs
and revenues of a stadium."); see also, e.g., ROSENSW EIG, supra note 6, at 13 (suggesting public costs for
a project in Cleveland were more than $1 billion); Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 123, at 361 (arguing
that a baseball stadium in Cleveland cost not the promised $128 million, but between $176 million and
$180 million).
132. See Turner, Civic Pride, supra note 125, at 8 (arguing that the symbolic value of teams is worth
the money if"articulated to be a part of what government should be doing"); Turner & Marichal,supra note
105, at 170 ('lIlt may be some intangible value associated with having a common identification symbol
which brings major league status to a city that is the driving force behind public investment in sports.").
133. Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 122, at 30.
134. RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 27; Sidlow & Henschen, supra note 103, at 168 (arguing that,
like other public-policy decisions, the choice to build a stadium is the culmination of a "primeval soup" of
ideas, parties, events, and circumstances).
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debates centered on how to lure or retain a sports franchise and make it
successful. The public gains a vested interest in the presence and athletic and
fiscal success of the team (beyond what sports fans normally hold in their
teams); public dollars are expended for the explicit purpose of ensuring a
successful private business entity and a championship sports franchise, with
the expectation or hope that the team will give something, symbolic or
tangible, back.'
The revenue that the community receives, usually through rents paid on
the stadium, is inextricably linked to attendance and to the money taken in by
the stadium.'36 The more people come, the more revenue the team earns, and
the better the team will be (assuming money is spent wisely on the team). The
better the team and the ballpark experience, the more people will come, the
more money the community collects in rent and other ballpark revenues, and
the more money spent in the neighborhood surrounding the facility.
Regulations on fans and cheering speech are intended to further these
economic goals. Teams act (and government likely supports those actions) on
the laudable desire to make the experience of attending the game as pleasant
as possible for the greatest number of fans, especially young fans and families,
ensuring large numbers will pay to return. But to the extent regulations on
cheering speech run afoul of the First Amendment, the situation begins to look
like Burton itself. The restaurant there argued that serving black patrons
would injure its business, reducing its profits, and, in turn, the amount it
would pay to the government in rent; the Court rejected the argument that a
government agency could make private discrimination an "indispensable
element[]" in its financial success.'37 In the same way, the prevalence of loud
and objectionable (but constitutionally protected) speech in the stands may
hurt fan satisfaction, reducing attendance and the amount paid to the
community in rent. But the community cannot benefit from stadium rules that
enhance stadium profits by violating free speech principles.
135. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 245 ("A winning team reinforces the societal values upon hard
work, discipline, good character .... the 'American way of life'...."); see also Turner, Civic Pride, supra
note 125, at 8 ("We should make teams an integral contributor to the civic fabric .... ).
136. See Forsythe, supra note 103, app. at 267-302 (showing financing details of baseball and
football stadium deals, many of which tie rent to a percentage of gate receipts); Misey, supra note 10, at
235 (stating that the Baltimore Orioles pay rent based on a percentage of receipts); Noll & Zimbalist, supra
note 122, at 28.
137. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,724 (1961) ("Neither can it be ignored,
especially in view of Eagle's affirmative allegation that for it to serve Negroes would injure its business,
that profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable elements in, the
financial success of a governmental agency.").
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One federal court accepted this very argument as to the renovation and
operation of Yankee Stadium, finding that the exchange of mutual benefits
made the New York Yankees state actors in enforcing Major League
Baseball's rule prohibiting female sportswriters from entering the Stadium
clubhouses.'38 The court emphasized that annual rent paid to New York City
depended on the team's drawing power and on attendance at games, sufficient
to create a symbiotic relationship between the team and the city. 1
39
2. Entwinement
The Supreme Court recently introduced a new, independent test for state
action, one forged in the relevant context of a First Amendment claim. 40 This
test looks to whether a private entity is so "entwined" with government that
the ostensibly private organization takes on a public character as to particular
conduct. 4 ' Krotoszynski described entwinement as "an amalgam of bits and
pieces of evidence relevant to pre-existing state-action tests but perhaps
insufficient to satisfy any one of the tests standing alone."14
Entwinement depends on the details, terms, and conditions under which
a stadium is built and operated and the respective roles of the team and the
government in those operations. A range of facts may suggest entwinement,
including the details of the policy choices and goals underlying the team's
demand, and the community's willingness to pay, for the stadium.
4 3
138. See Ludtkev. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86,93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kende, supra note 4, at 241; Jan
Stiglitz, An Inquiring Woman, in COURTING THE YANKEES, supra note 4, at 101, 105-06.
139. See Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. at 93-94; Stiglitz, supra note 138, at 106.
140. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
Brentwood Academy addressed a First Amendment challenge by a private school to a state high school
athletic association's anti-recruiting rule. Id. at 293.
141. Id. at 302. Entwinement was present in Brentwood Academy because the state high school
athletic association wascomprised ofall schools in the state, eighty-four percent of which were public, and
representatives of each of those schools selected the legislative and executive bodies that made and enforced
association policies. Id. at 298-300. From the other direction, members of the state board of education
served as ex officio members of the association's governing bodies. Id. at 300.
142. Krotoszynski, Remembrance, supra note 83, at 1066; see Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295
("What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity.").
Entwinement reflects the flexible "meta analysis" that Krotoszynski himself called for in 1995,
arguing that even when a "defendant does not satisfy any one of the three state action tests, a reviewing
court should step back and consider whether the defendant satisfies a sufficient portion of each of the three
tests to support a state action finding, even if no single test is satisfied completely." Krotoszynski, Back
to the Briar-Patch, supra note 81, at 337.
143. See supra Part II.B.1.
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One factor is the divide of title to and control over the stadium or arena.
Perhaps government retains title but expressly delegates to the team exclusive
power to establish rules of operation." Alternatively, perhaps government
reserves for itself the power to establish speech rules in its facility, which the
team simply is required to follow. 45 Another possibility is that title and
operational control rest with a third entity jointly established by the team and
the government; pervasive entwinement exists due to the "largely overlapping
identity" between government and that entity. 146 This may be the case with
Cleveland's baseball park, Jacobs Field. "The Jake," opened in 1994
specifically to keep the Indians from skipping town, 47 is owned by the
Gateway Economic Development Corp., a 50/50 public/private partnership
between the city of Cleveland and private investors. 48
Another relevant fact may be whether government provides police and
other security officials to enforce team-created speech policies by removing
fans who violate those rules.149 For example, the City of Cleveland provides
fifty extra police officers outside the stadium area beginning ninety minutes
prior to the game. 51 Police officers inside the park work alongside private
144. See Alexander, supra note 89, at 376 (arguing that cases suggest that governmmt cannot cede
control over speech on property to a private entity); Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-
Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 349 (1993)
(arguing that state action is present where a government function is delegated to a private actor); see also
Hamilton & Kahn, supra note 100, at 252; David Nakamura, Head of Stadium Project Has His Eye on the
Clock, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2005, at BI.
145. See Kuba v. I-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2004); Aubrey v. City of
Cincinnati,815 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (emphasizing the city's reserved power to establish
rules and regulations fora stadium); Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (emphasizing
the city's power to regulate some aspects of team affairs, such as ticket prices); see also Louis Michael
Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 391 (1993) (discussing a case in which
"government affirmatively commands or encourages private individuals to engage in the constitutionally
questionable conduct").
146. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 303.
147. See RoSENSWEIO, supra note 6, at 91; Austrian &Rosentraub, supra note 123, at 358-59.
148. See Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 123, at 360; see also United Church of Christ v.
Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449,451 (6th Cir. 2004).
149. See Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1106 (emphasizing the fact that the city enforced team rules and
regulations through its police force); ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 27, 52-53 (describing city-financed
security team of police officers working overtime to provide security inside and outside a ballpark in
Cleveland);, see also Black, supra note 82, at 86 ("If a private amusement park uses a badged policeman
to enforce its no-Negro policy, state and private power are so mixed as to bring constitutional guarantees
into play.").
150. See RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 50-51. Police presence is similar at other publicly owned
stadiums. See, e.g., Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1106 (refusing to dismiss a city from a fan's lawsuit where
the city made an affirmative decision to support team regulations by having on-duty and off-duty officers
patrolling the stadium during World Series games); Misey, supra note 10, at 235-36 (emphasizing that the
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ushers and security guards to perform a "well-choreographed bunker
maneuver" to watch the crowd and dissuade any misconduct during stoppages
in play.' The private entity links to public power in the operation of the
arena. That degree of entwinement increases if local police go beyond merely
enforcing to actually helping develop fan-conduct policies.15 1
Note that finding entwinement because of police enforcement of team
policies goes beyond ordinary police acquiescence in and enforcement of
neutral private-property rules.' 3 State action is not present merely because
government enforces private legal choices.'54 Nor is this a situation in which
one speaker has been granted short-term access to a public forum, during
which time the speaker remains a private actor and retains control over the
expression that occurs in the forum. '55
Rather, stadiums present the different case of government lending its
enforcement muscle to assist the private entity in its long-term and exclusive
management and control of government property. Pervasive entwinement is
present because government has turned long-term control over its space to the
private entity, then agreed to wield public power to enforce those private
choices. The exercise of private power (managing the grandstand public
forum) is a product of public laws and force.'56
3. Public Function
The Sixth Circuit employed a different approach in finding Cleveland's
Gateway Corporation to be a state actor in a free-speech case involving a
Baltimore Orioles baseball team and the local government share responsibility for hiring police to provide
security at games).
151. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 52-53.
152. Cf. Aubrey, 815 F. Supp. at 1105 (describing thecity's retained, although unexercised, power
to establish rules and regulations for occupancy of the stadium by a baseball team).
153. See Alexander, supra note 89, at 365-66 ("[Sltate action permitting and enforcing private
choices of a type the state would be constitutionally forbidden to make is not necessarily or even usually
unconstitutional .. "); Gary Pellet & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO.
L.J. 779, 790 (2004).
154. But see Black, supra note 82, at 92 (arguing that the enforcement of private contract and
property rights brings constitutional restrictions into play); Peller & Tushnet, supra note 153, at 790 ("If
the state recognizes the host's power to exclude, it has created a property entitlement backed up by the
coercive power of the state .... ").
155. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566-67
(1995) (accepting the lower-court determination that parade organizers were not state entities when using
public streets for a parade).
156. See Alexander, supra note 89, at 377.
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prohibition on protests.' The protest took place on the sidewalk outside
Jacobs Field, but within the multi-stadium downtown complex that includes
a basketball arena, parking garage, and common area. ' That court relied on
the long-established "public function test," under which a private entity is a
state actor if it performs a traditionally exclusive government function.'59
According to the court, the sidewalk looked and felt like a typical public
sidewalk, was integrated into the downtown grid, and indistinguishable from
an adjoining public sidewalk, making it a traditional public forum. 160 In
managing this traditional public forum, Gateway performed a public function
and became a state actor in doing so.' 6 '
This approach is problematic in its circularity. A speaker's First
Amendment rights in a forum demand both that the place be an appropriate
forum for her speech and that the entity controlling the forum be a state actor.
The Sixth Circuit approach uses the former to establish the latter.'62
Moreover, the test seems boundless. The upshot may be that operating any
property that can be characterized as a public forum, without more, makes the
operator a state actor. Given that the grandstand at any sports stadium,
ballpark, or arena properly should be characterized as a designated public
forum,'63 this test subjects any entity that runs a stadium or arena, including
a private university, to the First Amendment. This perhaps is a positive
development from the standpoint of maximizing cheering speech. 64 But it is
inconsistent with the long-standing refusal to characterize as a public function
157. See United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 454-55 (6th Cir.
2004).
158. See id. at 451; Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 123, at 358 (describing the stadium complex
in downtown Cleveland, including a baseball park, basketball arena, and other entertainment venues).
159. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tean. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (holding that a private company that owned and controlled a
town, a space indistinguishable from an ordinary municipality, was a state actor); Eule & Varat,supra note
81, at 1555-56; Krotoszynski, Remembrance, supra note 83, at 1065.
160. United Church of Christ, 383 F3d at 452.
161. See id. at 454-55.
162. That circularity is illustrated by the court's treatment of the Gateway Commons, another area
within the ballpark complex to which the protesters sought access. The court held that this area was not
a designated public forum; therefore, the court said, "even if Gateway were treated as a state actor for
purposes of the Commons, the restrictions on their usage would satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 453.
163. See supra Part I.
164. See Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 82, at 1641 ("[W]hen private institutions prohibit
and punish expression there is a loss of speech, just as when the government prohibits and punishes
expression.").
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the mere operation, without more, of otherwise private space with which
speech may be compatible. 6
A brake on the test could come by distinguishing stadiums based on
design. Gateway Development owns a multi-feature complex whose grounds
are adjacent to and indistinguishable from a public sidewalk, blended into the
urban grid. 66 In fact, the commons and sidewalk were public spaces until they
were turned over to Gateway as part of the development project for the
ballpark.1 67 Although no longer public, the sidewalk continues to perform the
same function as before. By contrast, the grandstand within a stadium or
arena does not share that similarity in appearance, function, or history. 6 '
Neither does an arena located in the middle of private university campus.
Thus, even if the grandstand could be analyzed as a designated public forum,
controlling such a forum would not be a public function comparable to
controlling a sidewalk.
One final note on treating franchises as state actors. The conversion is
limited to the team's functions in operating the publicly owned ballpark,
including regulating fan expression. State action tests all focus on the
connection between government and the private entity with regard to a
particular activity, with state action established only as to that particular
activity. 69 None of these arguments requires the conclusion that the baseball
or football franchise is a state actor for any and all purposes, such as employee
relations, hiring and firing concessionaires and vendors, or making player-
personnel decisions. 7° The entwinement between franchise and government
touches only the grandstand within that publicly owned stadium. The team's
"public function" is managing that stadium, not all its activities not
immediately tied to the stadium.
165. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); Eule & Vamt, supra note 81, at 1559.
166. See United Church of Christ, 383 F3d at 452.
167. See Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 123, at 358-59; see also Turner, Politics of Design,
supra note 100, at 533 (arguing that urban downtown public space is increasingly privatized).
168. See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in thejudgmmts); supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
169. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 US. 288,295 (2001) (stating
that "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the
challenged action' (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,351 (1974))) (emphasis added).
170. See United Church of Christ, 383 F.3d at 455 ("[O]ur decision in today's case has no bearing,
for instance, on whether Gateway's employees would receive First Amendment protection for their
workplace speech or whether Gateway would have to comply with the Due Process Clause when firing a
subcontractor.").
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C. Protecting Free Speech
There is an important distinction between the First Amendment and free
speech. The former is the Constitution's textual commitment to free speech
applicable against government; the latter is the popular tradition and
understanding of people's rights to express themselves and to participate in
public discussion.' Recognizing that "more speech is better,"'72 powerful
private institutions (private universities or professional sports leagues and
franchises) may voluntarily act in ways that will expand opportunities for
individual expression by conforming to First Amendment principles,
furthering the free-speech tradition, even if not constitutionally compelled to
do so.' We might particularly hope universities would do so, given their
unique purpose as a place for expression and exchange of ideas, a purpose that
should carry into the bleachers at the basketball arena. 74
Alternatively, perhaps communities could impose the obligation on
professional franchises not by constitutional law, but by private contractual
obligation. Cities could negotiate in the stadium deal and lease a requirement
that the team recognize the grandstand as a public forum for cheering speech
and abide by First Amendment limitations in setting stadium policy. A
community's decision to build a stadium for the team reflects a policy choice,
but it is a choice at least influenced (if not necessarily coerced) by the team's
insistence that it needs the facility and a veiled threat to leave town if it does
not get it. 7 5 It is appropriate that consideration for that benefit includes the
team respecting the free speech interests of the community members who want
to make themselves heard on the game and other issues at the stadium. Of
course, to the extent a team finds this condition unacceptable, it could avoid
the condition by foregoing the government benefit and finding other ways to
pay for its arena or stadium.
171. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 414-15; see also Chemerinsky,
Rethinking, supra note 82, at 510 ("Speech can be chilled and lost just as much through private actions as
through public ones."); Michael Kent Curtis,Judicial Review andPopulism, 38 WAKEFOREST L. REV. 313,
360-61 (2003) ("The majority had no right to silence the minority. All had the right to discuss political,
moral, and social questions and to espouse any theory they chose.").
172. See Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 82, at 1641.
173. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 418. But see Eule & Varat, supra
note 81, at 1564-65 (describing a "radical departure from constitutional tradition" regarding state
constitutional provisions protecting free speech rights against private incursion).
174. Cf. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000)
(describing the university as a place which "undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech and
ideas").
175. See Sidlow & Henschen, supra note 103, at 168; supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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Curtis Berger suggested something similar as to privately owned shopping
malls; he argued that government should condition approval of a development
project (especially a project in which the developer acquires government land
through lease or purchase) on the developer agreeing to provide and maintain
an expressive forum within the mall.7 6 The ballpark and the shopping mall
both exemplify the politics of modem downtown development. Both grant
private control over public space, thereby decreasing the amount of public
space, all while providing a private financial benefit" Civil society depends
on reasonable public access to and use of such public space.' That is why
the First Amendment commands that government create public forums. 79 If
government is turning large amounts of public space over to private control,
one way to satisfy that obligation is to insist that private entities receiving this
benefit leave room for expression within the public space that the community
has placed under the entity's exclusive control. 80
Of course, government and the popular majority dislike outrageous,
offensive, and profane cheering speech as much as the team does. The public
actually may prefer not to impose this obligation on the team, leaving the team
freer to regulate fan expression, in order to maximize revenue and other
benefits. This is especially true if those speech restrictions succeed in
enhancing public revenues by ensuring a positive experience for fans. 8 '
For our purposes, the question is whether the state, limited as it is in how
it could regulate cheering speech if it controlled the stadium, has sufficient
justification for allowing a private franchise controlling the public stadium to
do what the state itself could not. But any justification must itself be of
constitutional provenance, grounded in countervailing constitutional concerns
(such as equality)." 2 A motive of securing the full economic benefits of the
stadium, without more, would not be sufficient.
176. Berger, supra note 38, at 675-76.
177. See Turner, Politics of Design, supra note 100, at 533 ("Increasingly, downtown space is
privatized and reflects a power over space that is generated through public authority but oftm wielded by
private interests.").
178. See id. at 542-43.
179. See BAKER, supra note 51, at 170-71; SMOLLA, supra note 51, at 208-09; Gey, Reopening,
supra note 37, at 1538-39; supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
180. Cf Turner, Politics of Design, supra note 100, at 542 (discussing ways in which public access
can be integrated into private development).
181. See Berger, supra note 38, at 686; supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
182. See id. at 378; see also, e.g., id. at 377 (arguing that the state's interest in protecting academic
freedom may justify permitting a private university to impose a speech code).
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Ill. TALKING SPORTS
Sports fanship is an American cultural phenomenon." 3 Fans talk about
sport and through sport. 4 Fans form an association with a particular team,
experiencing that team's success as personal success and that team's failure
as personal failure.8 5 It should not be surprising that fans want to express
themselves about that fanship and their feelings of success or failure.86 As
Daniel Wann explains: "The ebb and flow of game action, the
point/counterpoint of team success and failure, the spectators' empathic
identification with heroes and vilification of villains, the thin line spectators
walk between tragedy and ecstasy, all combine to engage them in a type of
emotional aerobics."'
8 7
The grandstand is the essential and appropriate space for this cheering
speech.' And we will assume that the entity controlling that forum either is
a state entity, a private entity morphed into a state actor through joint public
participation, or a private entity that otherwise has agreed to be bound by First
Amendment principles. 9 We look now at the forms this expressive outlet
may take and what efforts stadium operators can undertake to regulate that
expression.
183. See Hirt et al., supra note 4, at 724; see also GIAMATTI, supra note 3, at 14 ("Sports represent
a shared vision of how we continue, as individual, team, or community, to experience a happiness or
absence of case so intense, so rare, and so fleeting ... ").
184. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
185. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 244 ("[W]hen an athlete, a coach, or an athletic unit as a whole
fails to achieve, they are perceived by the fan as having failed him personally."); WANN ET AL., supra note
4, at 19 ("Fans experience the 'thrill of victory' ... and the 'agony of defeat' when their team loses."); Hirt
et al., supra note 4, at 724 ("Students were also found to use the pronoun we more frequently when
describing the outcome of a game in which their school's had been victorious ('We won!') than when their
school's team had lost ('They lost')."); Vecsey, supra note 7, at 126 ("Those good old boys on the field are
brave Texas Longhorns. But so are the fans who braved monstrous traffic jams, monstrous hangovers,
monstrous weekend rates at the motel.").
186. See WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198; id. at 62 (describing sports fans experiencing the thrill
of victory and the agony of defeat); Hirt et al., supra note 4, at 724 ("U]niversity students were more likely
to wear school-idontifying apparel on the Monday after a winning performance by their school's football
team than after a losing performance.").
187. WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198.
188. See Zick, Space, supra note 42 (manuscript at 49) ("Speakers' messages depend to some degree
on proximity to these places, not the ability to speak elsewhere."); supra Part .
189. See supra Part U.
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A. Viewpoint Discrimination
Begin with the easiest case. There can be no viewpoint-discriminatory
restrictions on speech in the public forum.90 Fans are permitted to support
and root for the home team or to support and root for the visiting team.' 9'
More fundamentally, fans are free to root against teams and players or to
make negative or critical statements or comments; fans cannot be limited only
to positive or supportive comments.'92 Penn State University unquestionably
ran afoul of this principle when officials ordered that signs calling for the
firing of the men's basketball coach be confiscated; the objection to the signs
apparently was nothing beyond the fact that they expressed a point of view
(criticism of the coach) with which public university officials disagreed.'93
Professional teams similarly ran afoul of this principle in ordering the removal
of fans from publicly funded venues for displaying signs and banners
criticizing and calling for the "firing" of the team owner or general
manager. 94 If fans cheer and support their team and its members when the
team succeeds, fans must be permitted to criticize or boo when it fails. That
is inherent in speech about sport (indeed, speech about anything) where there
are winners and losers and the conversation is going to be about winners and
losers.
One could argue that a command that fans keep things "positive" or "non-
critical" is not viewpoint discriminatory, because a fan still can cheer in favor
of either team. In other words, Maryland fans support Maryland by saying
positive things and Duke fans support Duke by saying positive things, but
saying negative things about Duke adds nothing to the expressive mix. The
argument misses the mark because rooting against one team does not express
the same message as rooting for another. One could root against Duke (many,
many people do) without rooting for Maryland or necessarily wanting
190. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824, 830 (1995)
("When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious
form of content discrimination.") (citation omitted).
191. Cf Schoolhouse Rock: Interjections (ABC Television) ("Hooray, Irm for the other team!).
192. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 40 (arguing that a rule allowing the display of only
positive signs supporting a team likely would be unconstitutional).
193. See id.
194. See Kende,supra note 4, at 240 (describingthe controversyoverthe removal at Yankee Stadium
of banners reading "George Must Go" and "Fire George," in reference to Yankee owner George
Steinbrenner); Wertheim, supra note 10 (describing an incident in which a female fan and her boyfriend's
son were removed from the NBA arena in Portland for waving a poster reading "TRADE WHITSITI," in
reference to the Portland Trailblazers team president).
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Maryland to win. The obvious comparison is to voters who support the
challenger for public office not because they particularly like the challenger
or particularly want her to win, but because they dislike the incumbent and
want her to lose. 9 5
The zero-sum nature of sports (someone has to win and someone has to
lose, except perhaps in hockey) means fans all are pulling for the outcome of
a Maryland victory. But the individual, internalized points of view expressed
are distinct. The idea is captured in a popular sports T-shirt: "I root for two
teams: [My team] and whoever is playing [My team's arch-rival].' '96 As the
Rosenberger Court emphasized, public discourse is not bipolar, but complex
and multifaceted, allowing for many distinct viewpoints on a single subject. '9
The principle of viewpoint neutrality means fans must be permitted to root for
Maryland, against Duke, for Duke, or somewhere in between those; each
represents a distinct, and protected, viewpoint on the single subject of the
game being played and everything extending outward from that game.
Of course, some viewpoint slant is uniquely inevitable in a sports venue.
As a practical matter, there will be more Maryland fans than Duke fans in the
state of Maryland (the place from which most tickets to the arena will be
sold), thus more Maryland fans than Duke fans will purchase tickets to a game
at Maryland's on-campus arena. Ditto for the relative numbers of Eagles and
Cowboys fans living in Philadelphia. The point is that any fans of a visiting
team who want to purchase available tickets to a game at the other team's
facility (something that has become easier in professional sports, where tickets
are available over the non-geographically limited internet) must be permitted
to do so.
Indeed, many teams have national fan bases that "travel well," meaning
they often outnumber fans of the home team.'98 If geographic distance is
195. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 5-6
(1981) (describing the process of "retrospective voting," in which a voter bases her choice on an evaluation
of her personal circumstances to determine whether the incumbent has performed poorly, rather than on
future-policy proposals from either candidate); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the
California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue ofJudicial Accountability, in JUDICIAL
POLrrICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 71, 71-73 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 1992) (describing a campaign
to unseat three sitting state supreme court justices based on their performance on the bench, without regard
to their replacements).
196. Cf ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 19 (quoting an unnamed University of Alabama football fan as
saying he would root for "Florida, Auburn, Notre Dame, Russia, and the University of Heir' before rooting
for the University of Tennessee).
197. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
198. See ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 54 (describing a football game in which fans of visiting Alabama
more than doubled the number of fans of home Vanderbilt); WILLIAM J. WAGNER, WRIGLEY BLUES: THE
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removed, the balance between home and visiting fans shifts
dramatically-imagine the Cubs playing the White Sox at either team's
ballpark in Chicago.99 or the eleven miles that separate Duke University and
its students from the University of North Carolina and its students. 00 To
refuse to sell tickets (i.e., to grant access to the forum) to these fans based on
their anticipated desire to root for the visiting team would be viewpoint
discrimination, prohibited in a public forum. The same is true for their
removal from the game once they have begun to cheer.
B. Political Content of Cheering Speech
Sociologist Harry Edwards argues that "there is literally no institution or
stratum in modem American society which is not touched in some manner by
sport."20  Through sport, we examine, discuss, and address issues of
community,"°2  race,2' gender,"" ethnicity,"' socioeconomic class,20 6
YEAR THE CUBS PLAYED HARDBALL WITH THE CURSE (BUT LOST ANYWAY) 72 (2005) (describing fans in
Chicago and St. Louis, separated by five hours, using games in the other city as an excuse to take a road
trip).
199. See WAGNER, supra note 198, at 135 (describing a game in the White Sox ballpark in which the
crowd seemed evenly split between people wearing CUBS SUCK and SOX SUCK T-shirts).
200. See JOHN FEINSTEIN, A MARCH TO MADNESS: THE VIEW FROM THE FLOOR IN THE ATLANTIC
COAST CONFERENCE 300 (1999).
201. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 3.
202. See JAY, supra note 20, at 2 (calling sports "a central lens through which we view the world,
helping many Americans to create a sense of personal identity and community and allowing us the space
to discuss often contentious issues"); WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at I (describing strong social bonds that
form among sports spectators).
203. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 190 ("For Afro-Americans, it might be thought, the vehicle for
advancement is sport rather than one of the avenues used historically by the European immigrants, such
as crime, political power, or the 'cornering' of certain occupational fields."); GIAMATTI, supra note 3, at
64 (arguing that baseball "made a tremendous promise-to play the game of America by the rules of the
Constitution and the American Dream"); JAY, supra note 20, at 30 ("True democracy, whether on the field
or in general society, demanded equal opportunity. For sports, and for the United States, to live up to the
stated creed, African Americans would have to be included."); JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT
EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND His LEGACY 9 (1983) ("The integration of baseball represented both
a symbol of imminent racial challenge and a direct agent of social change.... For civil rights advocates,
the baseball experience offered a model of peaceful transition through militant confrontation, economic
pressure, and moral suasion."); Timothy Davis, Breaking the Color Barrier, in COURTING THE YANKEES,
supra note 4, at 335, 340 ("Given that sport was viewed as embodying the 'American Creed,' it was not
surprising when increasingly aggressive campaigns to achieve access to opportunities for blacks in a wide
range of institutions spilled over into baseball.").
204. See JAY, supra note 20, at 165-66 (describing arguments that opposition to gender-equity
"masked a more deep-seated rejection of the very concept of the female athlete"); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity
Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 731, 791 (2003) (arguing that gender equity in athletics
[Vol. 67:525
FANS, FREE EXPRESSION, AND SPORTS
assimilation,0 7 higher education, °S crime and punishment,20 9 and patriotism. 210
Cheering speech thus cannot be derogated as unimportant.
21
'
Sport is awash in political symbolism. The "Star Spangled Banner"
signals the start of organized sporting events at all levels, a tradition dating
back to the 1918 World Series, played in the closing months of World War
1.212 Indeed, sport marks the only occasion in which adult Americans regularly
gather and collectively participate in these symbolic and ceremonial tributes
to flag and nation. Public officials place their imprimatur on games and use
"encourages girls to develop a sense oftheir own bodily agency and to develop a conception of themselves
as agents in their social and physical world").
205. See Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668,672-73 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment in favor
of plaintiffs challenging a state university's prohibition on protests against the university's Indian mascot);
United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing fans'
planned protest against the Cleveland Indians' nickname and mascot). In 2005, the NCAA banned teams
from participating in championship events that display hostile and abusive racial/ethnic/national origin
mascots, nicknames or imagery; teams, bands, and cheerleaders cannot wear or use such references,
nicknames, or images on their uniforms, clothing, and other materials. Press Release, National Collegiate
Athletics Associat ion, NCAA Executive Committee Issues Guidelines for Use of Native American Mascots
at Championship Events (Aug. 5,2005), availableat http://www2.ncaa.org/media-and-events/press mom/
2005/august/20050805_execcommrls.html.
206. See RoSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 27-28 (discussing the way in which the presence of
professional teams helps create community and smooth over class differences); id. at 96 (arguing that the
bleachers historically allowed people from various neighborhoods, occupations, and classes to temporarily
join together, rooting for the same team or jeering the same umpire).
207. See JAY, supra note 6, at 24 ("[S]ports remained an important cultural venue for many
immigrants, serving as a public ritual of inclusion...."); PETER LEVINE, ELLIS ISLAND TO EBBETS FIELD:
SPORT AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH EXPERIENCE 3 (1992) ("Sport in general, an activity lauded as open to
all based solely on talent, still gamers attention as a metaphor of American democratic ideals and a pathway
to assimilation.").
208. SeeJAY, supra note 20, at 190-91 (describing efforts by the NCAA to require colleges to impose
academic standards and create academic support programs for college athletes); SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra
note 23, at 5 (arguing that college athletics can be assessed "in terms of its direct effects on the core
educational mission of a college or university" and "in terms of its impact on campus ethos, alumni/ae
loyalty, and institutional reputation"); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIMECOLLEGE SPORTS 12 (1999) (describing the "cultural dominance" of intercollegiate
sports over college life).
209. See Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 383 n.36 (arguing that heckling a player accused of
sexual assault may function as a protest against unpunished athlete misbehavior); infra notes 267-73 and
accompanying text.
210. See JAY, supra note 20, at 52 ("For the United States and the Soviet Union, the Olympics
provided a rare stage upon which they could compete publicly and directly."); Wasserman, Symbolic
Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 392 ("Patriotic symbolism is an integral part of sport.").
211. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 824 (rejecting the idea of a First Amendment in which judges
can "portion out constitutional protection depending on their assessment of the 'social value' of the speech
act").
212. See GEOFFREY C. WARD & KEN BURNS, BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 132 (1994).
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them to further their political goals.213 Military flyovers are part of the
pregame ritual at the Super Bowl.1 4
This political meaning has become more pronounced since September 11.
Baseball stopped for six days following the attacks, then returned to an
American pageant. Fields were painted red, white, and blue; players wore
American flags on their uniforms; fans waved American flags; and ballparks
observed moments of silence and remembrance. "God Bless America"
supplanted or supplemented "Take Me Out to the Ballgame" during the
seventh-inning stretch (and continues as part of the game's rituals)." 5 The
tattered American flag recovered from Ground Zero flew above Yankee
Stadium during the 2001 World Series, six weeks and nine miles from Ground
Zero.216 Fans watched in awe as President George W. Bush stood on the
pitcher's mound to throw out the first pitch prior to the game.217
Fans in a public forum cannot be compelled to participate in the rituals
that attend these patriotic symbols. Rather, fans remain free to challenge the
symbols by engaging in what I label "symbolic counter-speech," counter-
speech that responds to and dissents from the message expressed by a symbol
or symbolic ritual using that symbol as the vehicle or medium for counter-
speech and dissent." 8 Symbolic counter-speech may take many forms.219
213. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 96-97 (describing ways in which political figures associate
themselves with athletes and athletes seek to associate themselves with broader, society-wide occurrences);
JAY, supra note 20, at 141 (describing President Nixon's love of sports and the way he used that to connect
with public); supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
214. See United States Army Public Affairs, Army Flyover to Kickoff Super Bowl, Jan. 30, 2004,
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?storyidkey=5627.
215. See Rebecca S. Kraus, A Shelter in the Storm: Baseball Responds to September 11, 12 NINE:
J. BASEBALL & CULTURE 88, 91, 95 (2003); Wassernan, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 393;
see also Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball Announces Patriotic Initiatives for
2002 Season (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with author).
216. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 393.
217. See NINE INNINGS FROM GROUND ZERO (HBO Sports 2004).
218. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 390-91 ;see also Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that "the remedy to be applied" to
objectionable speech is "more speech, not enforced silence"); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good
Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE
MODERN ERA 60, 84 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) ("The most important
environmental consequence of protecting free speech is the intellectual and moral pluralism, and thus
disorder in a sense, thereby engendered."); Michael Kent Curtis, "Free Speech "and its Discontents: The
Rebellion Against General Propositions and the DangerofDicretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419,433
(1996) ("Justice Brandeis thought of the First Amendment as empowering people 'to think as you will and
to speak as you think,' and.., the only appropriate remedy for much evil speech is counter-speech and
reason.").
219. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 394-98.
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Fans may refuse to stand for "God Bless America" or may turn their backs to
the flag during the anthem. Fans even may jeer one nation's anthem as it is
being played as protest against that nation or its policies.22
Cheering speech may entail an exchange of speech and counter-speech on
these political symbols and ceremonies. For example, a professional and a
collegiate athlete have protested the War in Iraq and other public policy
concerns by refusing to participate in game-related patriotic rituals.22 ' Fans
responded to both players with jeers and other cheering speech challenging
both players and their viewpoints, in turn reaffirming the patriotic symbols.2
Carlos Delgado's appearance at Yankee Stadium in July 2004 produced an
elaborate exchange. While most fans booed his expressive stand, during the
seventh-inning stretch at one game two fans unfurled a banner reading
"Delgado for President," to which other fans responded by booing the banner-
holders themselves.223
The political content of cheering speech extends beyond the symbolic.
Genuine public controversies play out in and through sport and may be
considered, discussed, and debated in that context. A fan uses cheering
speech to be heard on a range of public issues; the stadium provides her
singular, best opportunity to get her message heard by a substantial crowd. 4
There is no space more appropriate than the stadium grandstand for messages
protesting the team's Native American nickname and mascot as racist and
offensive,225 or, in the name of viewpoint neutrality, to protest the NCAA
220. See id. at 396-97 (describing two related incidents: fans in Toronto booing The Star Spangled
Banner and fans in Chicago responding by booing Oh Canada one week later).
221. See, e.g., Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 395 (discussing women's
college basketball player Toni Smith, who refused to face the American flag during the pregame national
anthem); Chris Green, Cheering Delgado's Dissent, ESPN.com (Sept. 22,2004), http://sports.espn.go.com
espn/page2/storypage=green/040922 (describing a protest by baseball player Carlos Delgado, who refused
to stand when God Bless America was played during the seventh-inning stretch). I leave aside the question
of whether either player's respective teams could have forced them to halt their symbolic counter-speech
and to participate in the ritual.
222. See WassermanSymbolic Counter-Speechsupra note 3, at 419 (describing visiting fans booing
Smith whenever she touched the ball, waving American flags, and singing God Bless America at the end
of the game); Green, supra note 221 (describing fans at Yankee Stadium booing Delgado).
223. See Green, supra note 221.
224. See Gey, Reopening, supra note 37, at 1538-39 (arguing that "the street corner has long since
ceased to be a focal point of either truth-telling or instigating the dissatisfied masses," but "every culture
must have venues in which citizens can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking about the world");
Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 431 (arguing that speakers must be able to use
expressive forums uniquely available to them).
225. See United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449,451 (6th Cir. 2004);
Steve Bauer, Anti-Chief Protesters File $2.5 Million Lawsuit, NEws-GAZETTE (Champaign, IL), Jan. 29,
2003, available at http://www.newsgazette.conilocalnews/story.cfm?Number13151 (describing an
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prohibition on the team's Native American nickname and mascot by
continuing to display the name and logo;226 the university's over-emphasis and
over-spending on athletics at the expense of academics;2 7 the comparative
spending and support for men's and women's athletics and the relative merits
of Title IX;2 28 or the public policy decision that led to the construction, at
public expense, of the very stadium in which the fans protest.229 None of this
is incompatible with other, expressive uses of the bleachers, as long as it all
remains there and does not obstruct other fans from watching the game.
Consider one final exchange of speech and counter-speech at the
ballgame. In 1997, Major League Baseball commemorated the fiftieth
anniversary of the integration of baseball by ordering all teams to retire Jackie
Robinson's number 42 uniform, marking the official retirement in a pregame
ceremony at New York's publicly owned Shea Stadium. 3 ° Suppose a group
of Ku Klux Klan members attend that game en masse specifically to protest
the ceremony and the honoring of Robinson. They wave Confederate flags
and they jeer, chant, and display banners denouncing Robinson, non-white
players, and the integration of baseball ("The game was better when it was all-
white"). The on-field ceremony in which Major League Baseball, the New
incident in which fans were removed from the basketball arena at the University of Illinois for chanting
against the school's "Chief Illiniwek" mascot).
226. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
227. See JAY, supra note 20, at 193 ("[T]he growing revenue streams available in college basketball
led schools to make decisions based more on finances than on what might be best for their student-
athletes."); SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 23, at 3 ("As many faculty critics have pointed out, there is
no direct connection between organized athletics and the pursuit of learning for its own sake."); id. at 27
("As time passed, even the less intensive programs, which were once viewed as ancillary, consumed more
and more institutional resources ... ").
228. See JAY, supra note 20, at 188 (describing arguments that notions ofgender equality should not
take precedence over the demands of the athletic marketplace and the creation of revenues); SHULMAN &
BOWEN, supra note 23, at 124 ('Olne can empathize with the male athletes and coaches who feel that their
sports programs now face new restrictions, and who in some cases see gender equity as the cause of those
restrictions .. "); Yuracko, supra note 204, at 732 (describing criticisms of Title IX for guaranteeing
female students proportional athletic opportunities even if they have lower levels of athletic interest and
ability than male students).
229. See Bratspies,supra note 105, at 294 (describing the "wide applause"that greeted the New York
City mayor who insisted that the city "had bigger things to worry about" and "could ill-afford to build
baseball stadiums"); Sidlow & Henschen, supra note 103, at 169 (arguing that the decision to build a
stadium with public funds is a public-policy choice, but recognizing the argument that a city is held hostage
by a team's threats to leave town); Turner & Marichal, supra note 105, at 190 (describing the interaction
between professional teams threatening to leave town and local leaders who become willing to build new
stadiums).
230. Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball Retires Robinson's No.
42-Forever (Apr. 15, 1997) (on file with author).
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York Mets, New York City, and the fans honor a great player and arguably the
vital historic moment in sports (and American) history surely is appropriate
cheering speech.23'
If Robinson's contributions can be honored in the forum, they also can be
criticized and denounced in the forum. To deny these fans the use of the
forum is to deny them the best, most appropriate place for their undeniably
political, undeniably protected message.232
C. Heckling
Cheering speech extends well beyond huzzahs, whistles, and applause
that express hope and satisfaction that one's team wins or the other team loses.
Rather, the purpose of cheering speech is to make noise in such a way as to
influence (or at least to feel that one is influencing) the outcome of the game
in favor of one's team.
2 33
One way of doing this is through cheering that targets a particular player
whenever the nature of the game focuses attention on that individual: the
basketball player stepping to the free-throw line,3 the batter and pitcher
locked in a solo battle,23 or the player who just did something important on
the field, good or bad, and on whom all eyes rest.2 36 And of course, fans will
231. See JAY, supra note 20, at 31 ("When a black man took the field with white teammates ... the
idea of integration suddenly seemed possible."); TYGIEL, supra note 203, at 9 ("Jackie Robinson's
campaign against the color line in 1946-47 captured the imagination of millions of Americans who had
previously ignored the nation's racial dilemma."); infra Part llI.F.
232. See Zick, Space, supra note 42 (manuscript at 30) (arguing that the ability to protest in or near
a particular space may be critical to the intended message).
233. See ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 55 ("Fans who attend sporting events in part do so in order
to help their teams win games and thus feel themselves as part of the action."); Wasserman, Cheers, supra
note 6, at 386 ("Students are encouraged to attend games and make noise ... and to create a playing
envimnment that will be intimidating or distracting to the opponent and will give their team a home-court
advantage."); Eric Hoover, Crying Foul Over Fans' Boorish Behavior, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), Apr. 9, 2004, at A36 [hereinafter Hoover, Crying Foul] (describing students who view themselves
as participants in the game and ways in which schools encourage that view).
234. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 42.
235. See Ernest L Thayer, Casey at the Bat, S.F. EXAMINER, June 3, 1888, at 4:
Ten thousand eyes were on him as he mbbed his hands with dirt;
Five thousand tongues applauded when he wiped them on his shirt.
Cf. FERRIS BUELLER'S DAY OFF (Paramount 1986) ("Hey, batter, batter! Swing batter!").
236. See Vecsey, supra note 7, at 129 ("When the shortstop fumbles the grounder, he is naked to the
world. He must stand there and scuff at the dirt while the fans give him advice.").
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seek out the star player or high-profile coach for special heckling.23 7 In fact,
star players often treasure the taunts that rain down from fans.238
It is incoherent to prohibit, as one collegiate conference has, cheers that
"attack or single out" particular athletes.239 It is impossible to cheer at a game
without targeting comments at the player at the center of the action. Rather,
the policy, by using the word "attack," obviously is not intended to reach
positive comments or applause singling out that individual. The goal is not to
prohibit fans from yelling "Nice shot, J.J.," only to prohibit "You stink, J.J."
Anti-targeting rules thus break down as simple viewpoint-
discrimination-permitting positive targeted comments, but not negative or
attacking targeted comments. When Penn State officials objected to signs
calling for the men's basketball coach to be fired, there were no objections to
student signs praising the coach or suggesting that he should keep his job,
although such signs obviously would "single out" the coach.24
Heckling is unbounded in subject matter, limited only by the
compatibility requirement that all cheering speech must satisfy in the forum.
24
'
Hecklers may question the target's talent, ability, competence, intelligence,
eyesight, judgment, honesty (booing the player who tests positive for
performance-enhancing drugs), temper, consciousness, parentage, marital
stability, sobriety, past or present legal troubles, or just about anything else.
It can touch on many referents, more or less connected to sport and often
going beyond someone's skills on the court. The only limit appears to be
good taste, class, civility, and some amorphous concept of sportsmanship and
sporting conduct.242 Of course, those are not constitutional concepts. Rather,
237. See JOHN FEINSTEIN, A SEASON ON THE BRINK 181 (1986) (describing chants targeting the
opposing coach and his legendary temper); Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2 (describing student fans
targeting comments about the opposing team's star player); Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 377
(same).
238. See ROBERT W. CREAMER, BABE: THE LEGEND COMES TO LIFE (1983) (quoting Babe Ruth as
saying he "never had so much fun in all my life" when he exchanged taunts with both opposing players and
fans during the 1932 World Series). In a 2005 press conference, Barry Bonds of the San Francisco Giants
spoke of how much he enjoyed playing before the heckling crowds in the home park of the archrival Los
Angeles Dodgers, explaining that Dodger fans "say'Barry sucks' louder than anyone out there" and "you've
got to have some serious talent to have 53,000 people saying you suck." Henry Schulman, "It's Time to
Move On ": Bonds Brushes Off Steroid Questions, Praises Baseball's New Drug Rules, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 23, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-binlarticle.cgi.?f-/c/a/2005/02/23/
MNGQJBFKUS I .DTL; see infra Part III.D.
239. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 41-42.
240. See id. at 40; supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
242. See REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63, at 15 (defining sportsnmanship as including
"behaviors based on values, including respect, civility, fairness, honesty, and responsibility"); id. (requiring
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matters of taste and style (and, we might add, of class and sportsmanship) are
left to the individual.243 The First Amendment recognizes the impossibility of
line-drawing, particularly based on pejorative and subjective concepts, thus
it precludes government from making the effort.244
Players may make the personal public, rendering it fertile ground for
hecklers. Consider baseball player Kris Benson and his wife, Anna. In Fall
2004, Anna Benson went on a radio talk show and, in response to questions
about stories of ballplayers' sexual exploits on the road, said that if her
husband cheated on her, she would have sex with every single member of the
team, including clubhouse attendants, as well as members of the other team.2 45
She also went into great detail about the couple's sex life.246 There is no
constitutional reason (as opposed to one based on good taste) that this issue
is off-limits to a fan with a sign reading "Hey, Anna, has Kris cheated yet?"
One commentator conclusorily asserted that teams could stop a fan from
displaying a sign reading "The Manager's Mother is Easy.2 47 But why?
Someone's sexual and romantic entanglements provide obvious material, as
Hustler Magazine v. Falwelf45 makes clear. Indeed, Hustler can be
characterized as the ultimate heckle. The magazine published a parody of a
liqueur ad series that described the drinker's "first time" (drinking the liqueur,
but the sexual double entendre was intended); the parody depicted Falwell
describing his first time as a drunken rendezvous with his mother in an
outhouse.249 On its face, the ad expressed the idea that Falwell's mother was
easy, that both were immoral, and that Falwell was a hypocrite.25 ° However
outrageous or offensive to Falwell, the parody could not be the basis for civil
institutions to establish written policies and procedures related to sporting conduct);see also Wasserman,
Cheers, supra note 6, at 378, 390 (discussing efforts by universities to get fans to keep cheering clean and
classy).
243. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971).
244. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("If it were possible by laying down
a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little orno
harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description
.outrageous' does not supply one"); SMOLLA, supra note 51, at 47-48 (describing the conclusion that there
was no way to draw principled distinction among different forms of parody or satire).
245. Jeff Merron, They'll Love Mrs. Benson in NY, ESPN.com, Jan. 10, 2005, http://
sportsespn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=sexsports/threel2004; Lillian Ross, Talk of the Town: The
Pitcher's Wife, THE NEW YORKER, June 6,2005, at 36.
246. Merrn, supra note 245; see also Ross, supra note 245 (interview with Anna Benson talking
about meeting her husband while working as a dancer and the development of their sexual relationship).
247. See Misey, supra note 10, at 257.
248. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
249. See id. at 48; Post, supra note 27, at 606-07.
250. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
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damages.251 If the parody was protected when published in the magazine, it
should remain protected if a fan prints it (or something similar) on a poster
and displays it in a public forum, such as a sports stadium. So, too, should
oral expression of the same idea in that forum.
Robert Post explains Hustler as reflecting the view that, although human
dignity requires adherence to generally accepted standards of decency and
morality in a civilized community, those standards are not enforceable in the
area of public discourse, at least in the absence of false statements of fact.252
Cheering speech, uttered as it is in the cacophony of a large crowd,2 3 relies
on rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous and vehement epithets, deliberately
provocative overstatement, and loose, figurative language not intended to be
taken literally or seriously.2 54 It does not assert (or attempt to assert) a
provably true or false statement of fact.255 That is true whether the subject is
a player's marital fidelity or sexual morality, lack of skills ("You could not
play for my daughter's youth league team!"), or any other personal or team
characteristic described in loose and not literally true or false terms.
Heckling is a form of satire; it is caustic, it may be deliberately injurious
to its target, and it uses shock, exaggeration, humor, and ridicule to make its
point and to cut its target down to size.256 Satire, Peter Goodrich argues,
"brings with it a certain charge, potential animus, and occasionally an erotic
attraction. It is a very specific mode of sparring .... "2 7 Satire is "critical of
human institutions, human vices and follies, and often of individual humans
themselves."5" And discourse and debate on all subjects are better for it.259
251. See id. at 57.
252. See Post, supra note 27, at 616.
253. Compare ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 227 (arguing that sports crowds are more mature and self-
knowing) with REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63, at 4 (citing anonymity within large crowds as
a cause of sports-fan aggression).
254. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16-17, 21 (1990); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57;
Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions about Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1287, 1327 (2005) [hereinafter Gey, Questions] (describing protection for "nasty, abusive, and
vehement" hyperbole).
255. SeeMilkovich,497U.S. at 19-20 (emphasizingthat a statement on a"matter ofpublic concern"
must be provable as false before it can be a basis for liability).
256. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54-55; Post, supra note 27, at 613;see also Peter Goodrich, SatiricalLegal
Studies: From the Legists to the Lizard, 103 MICH. L. REv. 397, 426 (2004); Frederick Kiley & J.M.
Shuttleworth, Introduction to SATIRE FROM AESOP TO BUCHWALD (Frederick Kiley & J.M. Shuttleworth
eds., 1971).
257. See Goodrich, supra note 256, at 426.
258. See Kiley & Shuttleworth, supra note 256, at 1.
259. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54-55 (describing the historical influence of satirical political
cartooning); see also Kiley & Shuttleworth, supra note 256, at I (arguingthat satire is one of the oldest and
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Underpinning satire is humor, which "persuades in large part because it
attracts attention [and] it is engaging and engaged.""26 Humor removes the
mask of seriousness.261 Humor makes "explicit . . . human behaviors or
attitudes that usually go unnoticed because they are so common or
ordinary.262 Many of the First Amendment's heroes have used humor as their
expressive weapon of choice.263 It should not matter whether that attack
occurs in a comedy club or at a football game. Not all humor will succeed, of
course.2 6' The point is the effort, however sophomoric or unfunny.2 65 There
thus is a protected attempt at humor (not subject to prohibition, even if not
successful) inherent in Ohio State students attending a game against the
University of Michigan wearing T-shirts reading "Ann Arbor is a whore.
266
Finally, we cannot ignore the political commentary that infuses some
heckling. For example, fans have targeted college athletes charged with
sexual assault with chants of "rapist" and "no means no. 2 67  Fans have
taunted players for past involvement with drugs by waving fake joints during
the game.26t Jeering or taunting the player in such circumstances could be
characterized, at least in part, as a social or political protest against the fact
that this player continues to represent his team or his school despite his off-
court misconduct. Such heckling draws attention to the social problem of
athlete misbehavior generally.26 9
most durable forms of literature and will continue to endure).
260. Goodrich, supra note 256, at 505; id. at 501 ("Humor engages the body, it causes a physical
eruption, 'broken sounds,' trembling or convulsion.").
261. Id. at 503.
262. Kitrosser, Communicative Manner, supra note 64, at 1392.
263. See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE TRIALS OF LENNY BRUCE: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AN AMERICAN ICON 430 (2002) ("Lenny Bruce hoped to liberate words .... That was the reason
and risk of his humor.... The date of Lenny Bruce's death is as good a marker as any of the moment when
words alone-any performance words spoken in comedy clubs-ceased to be targets of prosecution.");
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 80-81 (1990) (discussing
comedian George Carlin, a target of an FCC indecency charge and thus a central figure in establishing the
meaning of the First Amendment).
264. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 263, at 23 ("'The funny thing about Lenny Bruce is that he
was, at times, not funny.").
265. Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. NewsAmerica Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("First
Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose
parodies succeed.").
266. Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 27.
267. See id. at 3 (describing chants directed at a University of Iowa basketball player in January
2004); Hoover, Crying Foul, supra note 233, at Al.
268. See Hoover, Crying Foul, supra note 233, at Al.
269. See JAY, supra note 20, at 4 ("[T]he problems of sports-cheating, drugs, violence, and an
overweening emphasis on financial gain-are bemoaned as representing the decline ofthe nation itself, with
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In similar fashion, baseball fans jeered and heckled John Rocker after he
made racist, sexist, homophobic, and generally offensive statements in a 1999
magazine article.27° The taunts directed at Rocker functioned as fan
commentary on Rocker's statements, as counter-speech demonstrating the
unacceptability of his social views.2 ' Of course, no one in Major League
Baseball suggested that such targeted jeering should cease-Baseball itself
imposed a lengthy suspension and fine as punishment for his comments.272
This again reveals the viewpoint bias inherent in objections to heckling; fans
are not restricted when they heckle or jeer players in order to promote a
favored idea-here, the social norm of"condemn[ing] contemptible views and
the people who express them.
273
D. Profanity
In suggesting the concept of "sports speech," Jed Rubenfeld pointed to
the most ancient and revered form of heckling: calling Roger Clemens a
"bum. '274 That word long has been the ultimate expression of criticism and
endearment in sport, especially baseball.275
The modem, and far more controversial, equivalent is announcing, via the
spoken or written word, that a team, player, or anyone else "sucks." That
word has become central to the modem sports lexicon. 76 Objection to it is
grounded in its sexual, and apparently homophobic, origins. 77 Those
objections were given voice in 2002 at Safeco Field in Seattle, an almost
entirely publicly funded facility on which the team pays $700,000 plus a
percentage of defined net income in annual rent, and retains nearly 100% of
sports serving as a sort of public barometer of ethical values and decency.").
270. See Volokh, Deterring Speech, supra note 70, at 1432-33.
271. See Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, and the First
Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1669, 1688 (2001) (discussing how private
individuals may react to ideas, and the holders of those ideas, that they find abhorrent oroffensive); Volokh,
Deterring Speech, supra note 70, at 1415 ("We should be polite and welcoming to those who have
unorthodox views on social security reform. We needn't, however, apply the same social ground rules to
those who have the unorthodox view that certain races are subhuman.").
272. See Volokh, Deterring Speech, supra note 70, at 1432.
273. Id. at 1414.
274. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 824.
275. Cf ROGER KAHN, THE BoYs OF SUMMER (1971).
276. See WAGNER, supra note 198, at 131-32 (describing the use of words, in written and oral form,
in confrontations between rival fans); see also Frank Deford, Commentary, Crowd Noise (NPR radio
broadcast Apr. 7, 2004) (criticizing the increasingly common use of word).
277. See Kende, supra note 4, at 240.
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revenue from concessions, advertising, naming rights, and enhanced seating.278
Baseball's Seattle Mariners tried to bar from the park fans wearing "Yankees
Suck" T-shirts.2"
More controversial were events at the University of Maryland in January
2004, during the men's basketball game between Maryland and Duke
University, when Maryland fans chanted and sported T-shirts reading "Fuck
Duke" and directed homophobic epithets at Duke's star player.280 The
incident dismayed Maryland officials, leading to an examination of possible
regulations on student cheering speech.2"' It brought to the fore the NCAA's
insistence with respect to cheering speech that "[s]creaming obscenities at
opposing players is not OK."28
2
The University of Maryland sought the counsel of the state Attorney
General, who advised the school that a written code of fan conduct at the
university-owned and operated athletic facility, if "carefully drafted," would
be constitutionally permissible.283 Maryland's Athletics Director began
working with a committee of students to devise rules of fan conduct.284 Teams
at all levels struggle with the question of whether hostile, profane messages
should be permitted in the forum.285
Not that profanity is new to sport. In fact, one commentator suggests that
old-school profane cheering has been drained away from new publicly funded
sports cathedrals: "I found myself terrifically nostalgic for the excessive, the
inappropriate, the picaresque-the vernacular behavior and the comportment
of the rowdies blissfully exiled together in the cheap seats in the old park. I
longed for the foul-mouthed commentary about the umpire's decisions... "286
278. Forsythe, supra note 103, at 279; Long, supra note 103, at 122; supra Part II.B.I.
279. See M's Ban Controversial Anti-Yankees T-shirts from Safeco Field (Apr. 29, 2002), at
http://www.komotv.com/news/story.asp?ID=l 8115.
280. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2; Hoover, Crying Foul, supra note 233, at A35.
281. See Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 377.
282. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 2-3 (quoting NCAA President Myles Brand in 2003).
283. Letter from John K. Anderson, Chief of the Educational Affairs Division of the Maryland
Attorney General's Office to C.D. Mote, President, University of Maryland 1, 4 (Mar. 17, 2004) (on file
with author); see Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 4; Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 6, at 377-38.
284. See Hoover, Crying Foul, supra note 233, at A37.
285. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 4 ("[I]t does not seem reasonable for the University to be
utterly without any means to address a phenomenon that has proved to be upsetting to large numbers of
fans."); see also Kende, supra note 4, at 240 (stating that Major League teams are split about what to do
about T-shirts bearing hostile messages). See generally REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63.
286. ROSENSWEIG, supra note 6, at 7; see also Vecsey, supra note 7,at 122 (describing hockey fans
in 1974 holding a sign reading "FuCK THE FLYERS"). But see Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 52
(describing 1948 list of"Rules of Scientific Heckling," the first of which was "No profanity").
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The linchpin of regulations on vulgar, profane, or indecent cheering
speech is the notion that fans at sporting events, particularly children, are
"captive auditors."2 7 They are captives in the stadium; the only way to avoid
being bombarded by chants or signs is to leave the arena and stop coming to
games.28 Such captive auditors are, unlike most objecting listeners, unable
to "avert their eyes" (or the more difficult task of averting their ears) in order
to avoid objectionable speech.289 The university or other stadium operator can
force speakers to alter their manner of communication to protect the
sensibilities of these captive fans.
In reality, the captive-audience doctrine is too limited to apply at the
stadium. Courts have found listeners to be captives in only four places: their
own homes, the workplace, public elementary and secondary schools, and
inside and around reproductive health facilities.29 ° Even in those places,
captive status permits government to limit oral expression, but not the
identical message in written form.29 ' Even captive fans can avert their eyes to
avoid seeing the "Fuck Duke" or "Yankees Suck" shirts or posters.
More importantly, the captive-audience doctrine never has been applied
to listeners in public places of recreation and entertainment, public forums to
which people voluntarily go to engage in expressive activity, such as watching
and cheering the game. Fans who pay to sit in the grandstand forum are not
287. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 3.
288. Id. ("[Pleople attending the game... are captives whose only recourse is to leave the stadium
or stop attending games.").
289. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,487 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
290. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-18 (2000) (recognizing a governmental interest in
protecting unwilling listeners from offensive messages on the sidewalk outside reproductive health clinics);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1994) (holding that patients and workers
inside a reproductive health facility are captive); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasizing the different
nature of protection for unwilling listeners in their homes); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978) ("Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
in public, but also in the privacy of the home .... ); Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,
210 (3d Cir. 2001) ('S]peeeh may be more readily subject to restrictions when a school or workplace
audience is 'captive' and cannot avoid the objectionable speech."); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch.,
98 F.3d 1530, 1541 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Children in public schools are a 'captive audience' that 'school
authorities acting in loco parentis' may 'protect."'); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate
Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1023 (1996) [hereinafter Volokh,
Freedom of Speech] ("[lit seems clear that workplace speech is generallyprotected despite the presence of
an arguably captive audience.").
291. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773 ("[f]t is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a
patient to stop up her ears, and no more is required to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the
clinic.").
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captive auditors there, any more than an individual walking on a city street or
in a public park who stumbles across an objectionable parade or rally.292
This constitutional analysis does not change because the audience at
professional and college games includes "young, impressionable children."293
The crowd at a game is, at best, a large mixed audience of adults and children;
the presence of adults constrains government's ability to protect children from
purportedly harmful expression.294 The level of discourse for adults cannot be
reduced to what is fit or proper for children.295 Similarly, the level of
discourse cannot be reduced to what is acceptable to the most sensitive
adults.296 In a mixed audience, there are two possibilities. First, children
unavoidably hear or see some "adult" expression and sensitive adults hear or
see what offends them. Or, second, we reduce the level of speech at the
stadium to what is suitable for a sandbox.297 Since the latter is impermissible
as a matter of free-speech principle, the former is, in some degree, inevitable.
The problem is even more difficult at college arenas, because the intended
audience is not families with young children, but the adult eighteen- to twenty-
year-old undergraduates who dominate the university community.298 While
families-children of faculty, alumni, and area residents299-are an expected
part of the audience, they are not the target and thus should not provide the
baseline for the appropriate level or manner of fan expression.
The Hobson's Choice that teams and commentators believe this creates
for young or offended fans-leave the arena and stop attending games or
292. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 & n. 18 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that offended residents
could avoid a Nazi Party rally simply by avoiding Village Hall for thirty minutes on a Sunday afternoon).
293. Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 24.
294. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876 (1997) (stating that restricting speech whenever it is
known that one member of the intended audience is a minor would burden adult-to-adult communication,
where there is no effective way to filter out non-adult members of the mixed audience).
295. See id. at 875 n.40 ("Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population... to... only what
is fit for children."' (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989))); Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down a state law whose effect was to "reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children" and stating that to do so was to "burn the
house to roast the pig").
296. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (197 1) ("Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most sensitive among us.").
297. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1983)).
298. See SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 23, at 3-4 (describing ways in which sports develop a
campus ethosby appealing to undergraduate students); ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 72 ("Pro football crowds
consist mainly of well-fed, middle-aged males, but for the college game in the South there is an abundance
of youth and women ....").
299. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 24 (one of the authors recalling attending several
basketball games at the University of California at the age of six or seven).
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tolerate offensive cheers3°°-is precisely the choice people make in any place
at which expression occurs. It is the same choice that people in a California
courthouse had to make when confronted with the "Fuck the Draft" message
on Paul Cohen's jacket.3"' In fact, leaving the courthouse was even less an
option for an objector whose job required her to be there or who had business
before the court and likely had to be there on pain of contempt or default.30 2
Moreover, it is inconceivable that "Fuck the Draft" is protected in a
courthouse, but "Fuck Duke" or "Yankees Suck" is unprotected in the
cacophony of a live sporting event. It is even more inconceivable that Paul
Cohen's intellectual heir could be prohibited from wearing his jacket to a
basketball game.
The real import of Cohen is the principle that a speaker's choice of words
and manner of communication are essential elements of the overall message
expressed and government cannot prohibit certain words without also
suppressing certain messages or ideas in the process.3 3 As Ronald
Krotoszynski argues, the "ability to define language becomes the ability to
control thoughts" and the First Amendment must be "an impediment to any
such project.""3 4 This is true even when the chosen word is the ultimate
taboo.30 5 The use of particular words in creating cheering speech reflects, in
part, fans' intensity, passion, and emotion in support of their team or in
opposition to their rival.06  "Fear the Turtle," "We Hate Duke," "Duke
300. See id. at 23-24 ("Other than putting in ear plugs, there is very little that a fan can do to block
out exposure to the uninvited and offending messages that he or she does not want to hear at a game.").
301. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential"
Cases and Larger Principles, 74 Tax. L. Rlv. 1251, 1252 (1996) [hereinafter Krotoszynski,
Inconsequential].
302. See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 290, at 1023.
303. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."); Kitrosser,
Communicative Manner, supra note 64, at 1350 (arguing that the "Cohen Court laid the doctrinal
groundwork for the notion that the manner in which one chooses to express one's self can have as much
communicative significance as one's underlying message .. "); Wasserman, Symbolic Counter Speech,
supra note 3, at 388-89 (arguing that "[p]oint-of-view includes everything surrounding and contributing
to the message," including choice of words, choice of communicative manner, the choice to appeal to
visceral emotion, and the time, place, and circumstance in which the message is presented).
304. Krotoszynski, Inconsequential, supra note 301, at 1253-54.
305. See SMOLLA, supra note 51, at 47 (emphasizing that the word "fuck" is "one of the single most
vulgar words in the American vocabulary"); Robert F. Blomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential
Taxonomy of American Morals (in a Nutshell), 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 65, 65-66 (1999) (discussing
comedian George Carlin's take on the word "fuck"); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 US. 726,751-55
app. (1978) (transcript of George Carlin routine on the words that cannot be spoken on television and
radio).
306. As the Cohen Court stated:
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Sucks," and "Fuck Duke" are four distinct, increasingly emphatic and
passionate ways of cheering for the Maryland Terrapins and against Duke.
Each conveys a distinct message and distinct point of view and each should
be protected within the expressive milieu of a sports stadium?0 Similarly
distinct, and equally protected, messages and points of view arise from the
speaker's decision to use (or attempt to use) humor, including risqu6 or
scatological humor, in creating her message.3 8
Profanity is, at least in the realm of discourse occurring in this forum, a
protected element of cheering speech. As Justice Harlan wrote in Cohen, "one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric."3 9 At a more "rarefied" level, Robert
Blomquist argues, "use of an F-word is almost always viewed as being
unfortunate, messy, repellent, or controversial," but we must make "judgments
about the context of the F-word usage," especially if it expresses something
stylistically." 0 Cheering fans often use profanity just as stylistically. The
intent of that style may be to shock, but it is style nonetheless.
One problem with a stadium rule banning profanity is its inevitable
overbreadth. It is not clear that stadium operators can (or in fact intend to)
distinguish between George Carlin's Seven Dirty Words on the one hand and
epithets that, while not employing profanity, target opposing teams, players,
coaches, or officials. What of Maryland students who chant "Duck Fuke" or
Kansas students wearing "Muck Fizzou" T-shirts-both are obvious plays on
the profanity that draw meaning only by reference to it, without employing the
magic word? Alternatively, the scatological nature of cheers could be lost on
those who might otherwise be offended. Students at the University of Kansas
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction
the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; see SMOLLA, supra note 51, at 46 ("Speech does not forfeit the protection that it
would otherwise enjoy merely because it is laced with passion or vulgarity."); Kitrosser, Communicative
Manner, supra note 64, at 1349-50 ("[T]he Court's discussion suggested that word choice, and possibly
other aspects of manner of speech, can have as much communicative significance... and thus should be
similarly protected, regardless of the nomenclature used to categorize such communicative choices.").
307. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 390 ('A] different speaker using
a different communicative medium and manner . . . is, in fact, presenting a different point of
view-something else worth saying and needing to be said."); see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 6,
at 2 n.4 (discussing a faction of college basketball fans who "hate Duke. Or really 'HATE' (expletive)
Duke").
308. See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
309. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
310. Blomquist, supra note 305, at 97; cf. Eric Vanatta, The F-Motion, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 285
(2004).
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were praised for their cleverness during a 2004 basketball game when they
chanted "salad tosser" at Texas Tech coach Bob Knight3 ' On the surface,
this referenced Knight's infamous verbal altercation several days earlier with
the Texas Tech Chancellor at a salad bar in Lubbock, Texas.3?1 2 But the phrase
is a slang term for a particular sexual act, a double entendre the students
almost certainly knew (which explains why they chose a particular phrase
which did not precisely capture what had happened at the salad bar), but many
listeners (including Kansas coaches and officials) likely did not.
The Maryland Attorney General supported its argument with reference
to broadcast indecency cases. The argument was that, as with indecent radio
or television broadcasts, offensive language at the game comes without
warning, is heard by children, and cannot be avoided by the captive
audience." 3 Commentators similarly suggest that factors the FCC uses in
regulating "highly offensive" or "sexual or excretory" descriptions can be
useful in defining the type of language that may be permissible at sporting
events, given the presence of children in the audience." 4
This reliance on the broadcast paradigm ignores the narrow context to
which the Pacifica Court took great pains to limit itself-the "uniquely
pervasive" medium of broadcast radio or television received in the privacy of
the home3  '-and extends it to a heretofore-protected live public forum. This
approach apparently defines "broadcast" to mean any loud oral expression
heard by a large crowd, even if not through government-owned airwaves. By
that expansive definition, of course, any mass-dissemination of oral
expression to a sizeable audience constitutes "broadcasting" subject to the
same child-protective limitations that never have applied to public spaces at
large.31 6
311. See Mike Norris, Knight Complimentary After Game, UNiv. DAILY KANSAN, Feb. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.kansan.com/stoies/2004/feb/08/knight-complime/.
312. Id.
313. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 3 ("Foul-mouthed fans 'broadcast' their words to the audience
just as offensive language was broadcast by Pacifica." (referencing Denver Area Educ. Telecomns.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978))).
314. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 10.
315. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; id. at 744 (narrowingthe prohibition to the factual context ofthat
case); id. at 750 (emphasizing the narrowness of the holding in the case); id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The result turns instead on the unique characteristics of the
broadcast media .... "); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Majorie L Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable
Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606,628 (1983) ("The Court's
opinion is, in fact, narrowly confined to cases concerning both the precise language conveyed and the
particular medium of communication .... Pacifica is about dirty words on radio.").
316. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (stating that the "unique
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Finally, the fact that most professional and major-college games are
broadcast on radio and television does not give teams or universities greater
regulatory authority over fan profanity at the arena." 7 The FCC's regulatory
authority over indecent speech extends to the broadcast licensees, but not to
individuals whose expression in a fully protected designated public forum
happens to be captured and shown over the airwaves.3 18 Otherwise, the scope
of free expression in a parade held on city streets could be limited to what is
permissible on television simply because the event is covered by the broadcast
media.
The Supreme Court's continued insistence that what works for broadcast
does not work in other contexts means that First Amendment protection for
speech occurring in public forums remains at its highest319 The fact that
expressive activities occurring in the arena bleachers incidentally may find
their way onto television does not change the analysis. Indeed, given the
ubiquity of video cameras and mass communications in modem society, any
other answer would represent a serious incursion into the scope of free
expression in a public forum.
E. Zoning the Grandstand
One current First Amendment controversy is the practice of zoning
speakers (especially at controversial protest rallies) into narrow designated
areas within the broader public forum, often far from the intended audience
or protest target. 32  Unable under basic free-speech principles to prohibit
dissenting, disturbing, and unsettling speech,32' government instead has sought
to segment such expression into particular places.322
problems" of cable and broadcast media may justify regulations that are unacceptable in other contexts).
317. But see Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 47,50 (relying on the fact that games are broadcast
to justify a requirement that fans with clothing containing large letters be placed at least 25 rows from the
court).
318. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2005) (imposing on licensees of radio or television broadcast
stations limitations on the broadcast of indecent material).
319. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814.
320. See Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 581-83.
321. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (rejecting broad government power
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from having to hear it); SHIFFRrN, supra note 263, at 10 ("If
we must have a 'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we should recognize that the dissenters-those
who attack existing customs, habits, traditions, and authorities-stand at the c enter of the First Amendment
and not at its periphery."); Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 384 (emphasizing the
need to protect the rights and interests of "those speakers who attack prevailing notions").
322. See Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 581-82.
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Stadium operators have attempted the same zoning within the grandstand,
in order to separate more vocal and offensive fans and to decrease the
purported harm that their speech causes.323 They utilize two basic approaches.
The first, primarily in college venues, establishes a "buffer zone" of several
rows between the student section (containing primarily undergraduates,
expected to be the most boisterous, profane, and pro-school fans) and the
visiting team's bench.324 The stated purpose is to minimize "interference" or
"intimidation" by student fans of opposing players.325 It also lessens the
likelihood that a verbal exchange could devolve into a physical confrontation.
The second method creates a "family section" at the stadium in which
profanity (oral and written) and alcohol (profanity's frequent enabler' 26) are
prohibited. This provides a small number of fans, especially those with young
children, the limited benefit of not having a neighbor screaming profanities in
their ears.
Of course, neither zoning method does anything to protect unwilling fans
or players from seeing potentially offensive clothing or signs or from hearing
profane chants and taunts emanating from elsewhere in the stadium. And we
should not blandly accept zoning as a content-neutral restriction on place,
because, as Timothy Zick argues, to "decide where expression takes place is
to ... make normative judgments about what speech should be seen and heard
and what speech should be segregated and avoided."327 Moving the student
section in anticipation of students' hostile cheering speech (and the offense
that players or other fans may feel from hearing such speech) regulates
according to speaker identity (regardless of what they, in fact, are going to
say), which is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.32 s
Objections to zoning generally sound in the concern that it will
disadvantage speakers by placing them into distant cages or pens or protest
zones far removed from the audience.'29 This is less of a concern within the
323. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 44.
324. See id. at 43-44 (describing conference and NCAA proposals to move students and the band
away from visiting benches or to leave rows empty or reserved for fans of the visiting team); id. at 47
(proposing a regulation involving a five-row buffer zone); REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63, at
7 (describing zoning efforts in college football and basketball venues).
325. Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 43.
326. WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 160-61 (describing the connection among sport, sport fandom,
and alcohol).
327. Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 651.
328. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117
(1991) (treating as content-based a law that burdened speech by the identity of the speaker, there, persons
convicted of crimes).
329. See Zick, Spatial Tactics, supra note 38, at 620 ("[Tlhe character of place substantially affects
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relatively narrow confines of a basketball arena; the student section cannot be
moved that far away, certainly not so far that the students cannot be seen and
heard. But the size of the buffer zone between students and the court must be
limited so as not to hamper fans' ability to make their cheering speech in its
most effective form, the form that will best help their team win.330
Similarly, a family section likely is permissible as a narrow carve-out
from the forum, so long as it occupies only a relatively small number of seats,
say 3,000 seats in a 40,000 seat baseball park. A team could not designate the
entire grandstand, or even a substantial part of it, as a profanity-free family
section. That would function, in effect, as a restriction on the (protected,
albeit profane) cheering speech of all the other, non-family-section fans,
reducing the level of stadium-wide discourse to what is acceptable to children
and sensitive listeners.
F. Limits of the First Amendment
The First Amendment, of course, is not absolute.33' No one may falsely
yell "fire" in a crowded theatre332 nor, we could add, in a crowded basketball
arena or baseball park. This only advances the argument so far, because the
categories of speech falling outside of First Amendment protection-the
expression that is not part of "the freedom of speech"-remain narrow, finely
defined, and limited.333 Three unprotected categories are worth considering
at the sports stadium: incitement to unlawful action,334 true threats,3" and
the experience of expression."); id. passim (describing the problematic use of protest zones, demonstration
zones, and security zones to control speech).
330. See Hoover, Crying Foul, supra note 233, at A36 (quoting a Duke University basketball fan on
the effect student cheering has on opposing teams); see also RoSENSWEiG, supra note 6, at 55 (describing
fans waving their arms behind the backboard as visiting players shoot free throws).
331. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 782 ("Doesn't
everyone know... that First Amendment rights are not absolute?").
332. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Robert Tsai, Fire, Metaphor,
and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 196-97 (2004) (calling this a "prototype for
unprotected expression").
333. See Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 854 (2005)
(describing the "fine line separating protected and unprotected speech" and emphasizing "the view that
unprotected speech categories must be carefully defined"); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963) ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate
in the area only with narrow specificity.").
334. Incitement is "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation ... directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and.., likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
335. True threats are those statements "where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
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fighting words.336 But analysis and application of these categories is context-
dependent; sporting events ordinarily will not provide a context in which the
cheering speech that fans utter will be left unprotected.
Importantly, we must distinguish between expression targeted at
someone, in that it speaks about a particular identifiable individual, and
expression directed or addressed to that person in a close, face-to-face
confrontational exchange. Much protected expression does the former,3 3 7 but
the unprotected categories reach only the latter type of engagement.33 The
difference between targeted and general dissemination means the difference
between an unprotected threat and protected cheering.33 9
Heckling targets an individual player by name or identity. It is not truly
directed to the individual, however, but rather to everyone in the crowd. The
taunting fan is one person standing at a distance in a large crowd and speaking
to whoever will hear. Fans are separated from their targets by distance, space,
and usually a wall or fence. Cheering could cross over into fighting words
where a fan and player are close enough to engage in a direct and one-on-one
confrontation, perhaps where the fan is sitting in a front-row seat or sitting just
across the fence from the bullpen.34° A fighting words situation also could
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
336. Fighting words are those "personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
337. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Post, supra note 27, at 645;
supra Part i.C.
338. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,523 (1972) (applying fighting words category to state law
interpreted as applying to remarks directed to an individual addressee); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (holding that
the use of profanity did not constitute fighting words because it was not directed to the person of the hearer
and no individual present reasonably could have regarded the words as a direct personal insult); SMOLLA,
supra note 51, at 162 (arguing that only a "verbal attack directed at a particular individual in a face-to-face
confrontation" can be penalized); Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless
Disregard for Truth in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REv. 887, 913 (2005)
("To the extent that there is a coherent true threat doctrine, it requires that threats be made to specific targets
.... "); Gey, Questions, supra note 254, at 1288 (2005) (arguing that true threats only should cover speech
"directed toward a specific and identifiable target").
339. The disposition in Virginia v. Black suggests this difference. The Court held that the cross
burning at a group rally on property leased by that group and not directed anywhere or targeted at anyone
could not be punishable as a true threat, while the Court remanded for trial a case involving a cross burning
on an African-American individual's private property, which, depending on intent, could have been
punishable as a directed and targeted threat. See Black, 538 U.S. at 348, 350, 367-68; Gey, Questions,
supra note 254, at 1352-53.
340. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 28; see also Steve Wilstein, Ballplayers Need Thicker
Skins to Tolerate Hecklers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 16, 2004 (describing a controversy when a player in
the bullpen responded to nearbyhecklers by tossing a chair into the crowd, striking one woman in the face).
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arise from a face-to-face confrontation between two fans, one of whose
cheering is personally directed and insulting to the other.34' It then becomes
necessary to consider whether the words directed to the target truly would
cause a reasonable person to respond violently, as opposed to merely being
disturbed. 42
In any event, most heckling (such as "You Suck" or "Your stats are as
steroid-bloated as you are" or "No means no") is in no way a threat of or
incitement to physical violence. 343  Nor can we forget cheering speech's
dependence on humor, satire, and rhetorical hyperbole and overstatement,
none of which is intended or reasonably capable of being taken literally.3 4
Except perhaps when Casey is at the bat in Mudville,3 4' no one expects or
intends "kill the umpire" to be taken seriously as a threat or call to immediate
arms.346  Similarly, hyperbolic cheers (e.g., "we'll kill you if you blow this
game" or "we're going to kick your ass") shouted from within a large crowd
at distant targets with no true intent or desire to cause imminent harm to the
directed individual are not reasonably taken seriously as a threat or call to
arms.
347
341. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 6, at 28.
342. See Zick, Space, supra note 42 (manuscript at 28) ("[O]ur expressive culture has traditionally
contained a healthy notion of tolerance for speech at close range, in personal spaces, even if that speech
upsets or disturbs."); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); SMOLLA, supra note
51, at 161-62.
343. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 188 (1984) (arguing
that there must be a showing of a "real threat of harm" to justify suppressing statements); Bezanson &
Cranberg, supra note 338, at 913 (arguing that a threat must "have a concrete and direct message such as,
'You will be harmed."').
344. See supra notes 256-67 and eccompanying text.
345. See Thayer, supra note 236:
From the benches, black with people, there went up a muffled roar
Like the beating of the storm-waves on a stem and distant shore.
"Kill him! Kill the umpire!" shouted someone in the stand
And it's likely they'd have killed him had not Casey raised his hand.
346. See EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 271 (arguing that the fact that fans bind their fortunes to their
teams' success makes their shouts to kill the umpire or murder the opposing quarterback understandable
rhetoric); see also REDISH, supra note 343, at 188 ("[O]nly such truly exacerbating circumstances, in which
listeners' reactions are easily predictable, should justify upholding expression of a statement which does
not on its face urge unlawful conduct."). But see Misey, supra note 10, at 257 (arguing, without
explanation or recognition of hyperbole, that "kill the ump" is unprotected).
347. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that statement "[]f they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." could not, in context, constitute a
proscribable true threat); Bezanson & Cranberg,supra note 338, at 907-08; Gey, Questions, supra note 254,
at 1345 (questioning whether Black expands unprotected categories to cover generally and ambiguously
threatening statements expressed in public and directed at a general audience).
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Any attempt to define particular cheering speech into an unprotected
category must account for its political content. Return to the KKK at Shea
Stadium during the Jackie Robinson ceremony.34 The players on the field, as
well as many fans in the crowd, undoubtedly would feel offended, intimidated,
angered, and perhaps threatened or moved to violence by a group of protesting
fans making racially and ethnically disparaging remarks.349 But as symbolic
counter-speech on an issue of social, historical, and political import (the
integration and ethnic composition of a culturally vital institution such as
baseball") in a forum uniquely dedicated to speech related to that institution,
this is the political expression at the core of the First Amendment that may be
vehement and caustic.35' The fact that listeners exposed to offensive political
messages may feel intimidated or may take offense does not deprive such
caustic expression of constitutional protection."2 Fans within the larger
crowd waving Confederate flags or denouncing Jackie Robinson, no matter
how offensive the form or content of the message, does not constitute fighting
words or threats as to untargeted fans elsewhere in that crowd.
Finally, genuine controversies over fan behavior have not involved
speech, but rather physical confrontations among players and fans. Most
famous, of course, was the "Malice at the Palace" in November 2004, when
a fan at an NBA game in Detroit threw a beer at an opposing player,
precipitating a brawl in which players and fans fought both in the stands and
on the court.353 Another example is the father-son team who ran onto the field
at Comiskey Park in Chicago and assaulted an opposing coach.354 The NCAA
348. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
349. Cf Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366 (2003) ("It may be true that a cross burning, even at
a political rally, arouses a sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority of citizens who see a burning
cross."I
350. See TYGIEL, supra note 203, at 9 (arguing that "[b]aseball was one of the first institutions in
modem society to accept blacks on a relatively equal basis," therefore it "offers an opportunity to analyze
the integration process in American life").
351. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (stating that political expression "may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials").
352. See Black, 538 U.S. at 366; Cohen v. Califomia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978); Gey, Questions, supra note 254, at 1309 ("If the virulence exception [to
the prohibition on content-based regulations] is defined to include the listeners' generalized reactions to
the frightening ideas conveyed by a speaker, then every dissenter speaking on a highly contentious issue
will fall within the exception.").
353. See Chris Ballard, The Eye of a Perfect Storm, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 29, 2004, at 50.
354. See Associated Press, Father Sentenced in Attack on Coach, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2003, at D6
(describing the sentencing of a man who, with his teenaged son, ran onto the field at a baseball game in
Chicago and assaulted the opposing team's first-base coach).
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Report enumerated several instances of fan violence, although most of them
took place outside the stadium following the game.3" And, of course, the





Of course, violent conduct is not protected as part of the freedom of
speech on any interpretation.357 Put differently, individuals can be punished
as a result of activities that run afoul of the law, so long as they are not
punished for their expression.35 This obviously should be true of sports fans.
There are no obvious free-speech defects in a 2005 New York City ordinance
imposing fines and jail time for fans who run onto the playing field or throw
objects at players.359
Teams attempt the additional step of regulating cheering speech on a
visceral desire to punish not only the fans who throw beer or run onto the
field, but also those whose raucous and offensive cheering created the
"emotionally charged" conditions or atmosphere in which those assaults took
place. 60 But outside of the narrow categories described above, expression, no
matter how outrageous, cannot be punished simply because someone,
unconnected to the speaker, engages in violence.36" ' Free speech ultimately
commands that the ordinary remedy is to punish listeners for the crimes they
commit, not speakers for the comments they make.362
In fact, fan violence falls far outside a social norm that fans themselves
maintain. As one commentator explains:
Crowds, as a result, have become self-policing. A group compact, predicated on the
understanding of a crowd's power, keeps the peace. When a fight breaks out at an
355. See REPORT ON SPORTSMANSHIP, supra note 63, at 3.
356. See Edward Grayson, Sentencing Soccer Hooligans, 140 NEW L.J. 831 (1990).
357. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,916 (1982) ('The First Amendment does
not protect violence."); EMERSON, supra note 25, at 8 (describingthe line between expression and action);
Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 782 ("[M]y right to express my political opinion of the President does not
entitle me to car-bomb the White House.").
358. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 776, 784 (distinguishing being punished "for speaking" from
being punished "as a result of" speaking); id. at 782 ("A person arrested for trying to car-bomb the White
House need not, and should not, be arrested for what he is saying. He can, however, be arrested for what
he is doing.")
359. Sara Kugler, Throw Debris on the Field, Get Thrown in Jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 16,
2005.
360. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 906 n.40, 928.
361. See id. at 927-28.
362. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Michael Kent
Curtis, Lincoln, Valladigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105,
172 (1998).
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Alabama game, people ease back rather than join in. They wait for the cops to come and
boo and hiss at those who would put the peace in jeopardy.., no matter what team they
pull for.
363
That compact frees fans in their cheering: they can wear their colors and
scream their heads off without feeling the need to edit themselves.364 And
there is no need for universities or professional sports leagues and franchises
to edit them.
Universities, colleges, and professional sports leagues and their franchises
have one final arrow in their quivers in their efforts to combat objectionable
cheering speech: their own speech.3 6' After all, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.366 We expect government, or anyone else,
to talk back to objectionable speakers.367 Schools and teams use the
scoreboard, sound system, band, mascot, and cheerleaders to drown out
negative cheers and to create their own messages. 68 Schools also might create
an "official" student cheering section, in which students engage in school-
sanctioned cheering, effectively functioning as the school's official voice in
the bleachers. Again, however, the area for such an official voice cannot
consume the entire forum space.
Those who control the stadium also have the power to try to persuade
fans, especially students, to keep their cheering clean, stylish, classy, and
creative.16' These efforts can include, as some conferences require, a public-
address announcement requesting student cooperation in maintaining good
sportsmanship, cheering in a supportive manner, and ensuring a safe and
enjoyable atmosphere at the game.37° Following the Duke controversy, the
University of Maryland established "voluntary compliance" policies,
including a profane T-shirt exchange program (presumably allowing fans to
trade "Fuck Duke" shirts for "Fear the Turtle" shirts), contests to encourage
363. ST. JOHN, supra note 8, at 227.
364. Id. at 227-28.
365. See Chemerinsky More Speech, supra note 82, at 1642 ("Institutions still can express their own
messages....").
366. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech,
supra note 3, at 387.
367. See Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, supra note 3, at 387-88.
368. See RoSENSW EIG, supra note 6, at 55; WANN ET AL., supra note 4, at 182; Calvert & Richards,
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students to create appropriate signs and banners, and having coaches address
students about the need for good sportsmanship."'
What public universities and powerful private entities such as universities
and professional sports teams jointly wielding government power cannot do
is compel cooperation. Nor can teams express their own messages by
silencing fans who cheer differently in the designated public forum that is a
stadium grandstand. They may not punish-even via non-criminal sanction
such as removal from the stadium--those fans who depart from generally
accepted cheering norms by loudly wielding loaded words and ideas to inform
opposing players that they are not very good players or people and that they
are going to lose this game.
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